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The House thanks God that the king is still in good 
health, and the Monarch is still in control of the affairs of 
the country.  We thank god for the assistance to Tonga 
from donor countries (Lord Lasike cited in Matangi Tonga, 
2011). 
 
At the first 2011 session of Tonga’s legislative assembly on 
June 9th the House was busy thanking god for king and aid 
donors, a variation to king and country, the usual saying.  
Tongan journalist Pesi Fonua poked fun at the country’s 
lawmakers by translating the parliamentary minutes into 
English for publication on his media website.  The original 
Hansard transcript in the Tongan language might not have 
been altogether amusing, but rather, standard convention for 
formally addressing the monarch.  However, one question that 
Fonua brought to light was at this time in Tonga’s history 
when a more democratic government was said to have taken 
the helm, had the hierarchal structure really changed?  
Furthermore, why had “donor countries” crept into the state’s 
salutations to the king, and which countries were Tongan 
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politicians thinking of – Western ones or China? (Matangi 
Tonga, 2011). 
Personifying a Western-centred view of Tonga’s political 
system, New Zealand researcher of constitutional law Guy 
Powles made a brash commentary to Radio Australia.  As a 
Palangi (white, European) observer, Powles presumptuously 
displayed his over-confidence in giving advice to Tonga.  
Claiming the Tongan “constitution does need to be studied in 
detail,” he felt certain “there are areas there of what one might 
call unfinished business.”  Specifically, “the original principle 
hasn’t been carried through, that is the devolution of executive 
authority” (Powles cited in Garrett, 2014). 
Powles was pointing at executive powers the monarch held 
onto compared to the ones which were handed over to the 
prime minister and the national executive by constitutional 
amendment in 2010.  Did reasonable expectation surface 
among the Tongan public that in the near future, all of the 
King’s executive authority would be delegated to the state?  Or 
could this be read as an explicit case of the Western ego 
fantasising that all Pacific Island states naturally desired to 
remake their civilizations and sovereignty in their likeness?  
This essay pokes the polemics and pragmatics of Tongan 
civilization enacted in modern times through a distinct set of 
cultural values.  How has the tenacity of Tongan civilization in 
today’s globalized world run into trouble with Western 
development partners – New Zealand, Australia, and America – 
especially when it comes to Tonga’s foreign relations? 
(International Business Publications, 2011). 
 
 
There is something peculiar 
I ought to be grateful my mother sent me to Tonga as a child 
because it has stopped me from becoming completely 
integrated into Western society as a New Zealand citizen, as 
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well as living with hopeless ignorance of how the oldest and 
only remaining South Pacific Kingdom manoeuvres in real 
politick.  I cannot say the same for fellow Tongans born and 
raised in New Zealand, particularly those who research in 
academia and show little, if any inclination to publish about 
Tonga.  Effectively this is a wise choice because if they did, I 
am certain they would surely get Tonga mixed up and 
confused with their Kiwi oriented value judgements about 
Pasifika peoples, the New Zealand government’s made-up label 
forced on top of anyone and everyone living in New Zealand 
who claims Pacific Islander ethnicity. 
I detest being name-called Pasfika in Auckland where I 
work and live.  Then again, it might sound less offensive than 
being termed something ludicrous like Lapita pottery peoples, 
or having to wear the sweeping categorization of ethnic 
minority.  Any individual or group fitted with ethnic minority 
grows an acute awareness that the label is designed to contain 
and control a diverse mass under the bureaucratic weight of 
naming things, especially alien things not considered the 
standard norm for an ex-British settler colony like New 
Zealand. 
The race accepted as normal here continues to be white 
people of Western European descent, despite history showing 
us that the islands constituting this country were first settled 
by indigenous Maori tribes who are Polynesian by the Western 
European logic of race classification.  References to Palangi or 
Pakeha in New Zealand, meaning white European, are choosy 
precluding individuals and groups of Eastern European 
decent. 
Similar to other settler societies founded under the 19th 
century British Empire, the line of ethnic and cultural 
distinction had been drawn between Western and Eastern 
Europe.  Eastern Europe crossed the border into Eurasia and 
central Asian civilizations, blurring the boundaries of pure and 
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proper European identity.  By contrast, Western Europe was 
counted as the real Europe; civilized, cultivated, liberal, 
wealthier, and the quintessential Pakeha New Zealander’s 
origin roots.  Whether in actual fact this was true did not 
matter.  Represented was a cultural truth New Zealanders 
were enduringly socialised to believe preserving the usual 
myths and legends about national identity. 
Whatever the case with New Zealand’s racial hierarchy, 
there was something peculiar about the way in which adults 
born in New Zealand formed opinions about how the homeland 
state where their parents and grandparents were born should 
progress, advance, and develop into a kind of mini South 
Auckland.  Their interpretive bias was very Palangi (white, 
European).  Overwhelmingly their thinking replicated what 
New Zealanders understood as Pasifika peoples congregating 
inside their national borders.  Why would the Kingdom of 
Tonga want to evolve into Otara and Mangere flea markets on 
a Saturday morning as the New Zealand icon of Pacific 
Islanders trading and bartering in the modern world economy? 
Plainly this was not the role model of development Tongans 
in the homeland state envisaged for themselves.  If the truth 
be told, in Tonga people expressed scepticism about the fact 
their New Zealand Tongan counterparts were disadvantaged by 
economic and social barriers to employment, education, and 
living standards on par with Palangi (white, European) New 
Zealanders.  Forty years of mass migration had witnessed 
Tongans resettle in New Zealand and grow into sizeable 
communities by natural birth rates.  Why had their lot in life 
not improved across generations to the point where they were 
now branded as New Zealand’s urban poor? 
 
What I am saying is that by homeland Tongan 
calculations, New Zealanders had a cheek to preach to their 
government about economic and social development (Aotearoa, 
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2014).  How far had New Zealand state and society developed 
since the 1960s and 1970s labour market influx of Pacific 
Islanders as unskilled and low-paid factory workers?  Why was 
the New Zealand Pacific population crowned by its consecutive 
state administrations as most likely to not have paid 
employment and tertiary education, and least likely to vote in 
general and local elections?  Given the grave disparity between 
Pakeha and Pasifika peoples in New Zealand, how could New 
Zealand claim any moral high ground of supposedly knowing 
what is progress for Pacific Island states to lecture Tonga on 
how to run their state affairs? (Bhattacharya, 1983). 
Polish academic Zygmunt Bauman who at eighty-eight 
years old is the emeritus professor of sociology at the 
University of Leeds, explained “the major source of 
contemporary fear” which can be said had seized New Zealand 
state and society (Bauman, 2011).  Put simply, the distress 
and dread that “no one is in control” of the contemporary 
world as people experienced it in their day-to-day lives fed the 
human condition of perpetual uncertainty and insecurity 
(Bauman, 2011). 
 
No one is in control.  That is the major source of 
contemporary fear.  The fears are scattered.  The fears 
are diffused.  You can’t pinpoint the sources where from 
they are coming.  They seem to be ubiquitous.  They seem 
to apply as much of a private life as a life in common, the 
social life; all sorts of things might happen.  It could be a 
tsunami.  It could be Hurricane Katrina.  It could be 
another earthquake.  It could be a sudden closing up of 
the factory in which you worked for twenty years.  Or, a 
hostile merger between two offices and you are losing 
your job.  It may be collapse of the stock exchange and 
you’re losing your old age pension and the savings 
you’ve made for many, many years.  It could be another 
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terrorist attack.  There could be sudden street riots and 
your shop is destroyed and burned; your car is stolen or 
burned, and so on.  In other words, it seems we are living 
on quick sands.  Every movement that you want to make 
to stabilise or position may have quite opposite 
consequences like quick sands; you may sink even 
deeper than before. (Bauman, 2011). 
 
Bauman’s “source of contemporary fear,” which is the 
unpredictability of economic life in a neoliberal environment 
where the combined power of banks, corporations, and open 
market trade dominated the state, which in turn, compounded 
the fragility of human security, was also the global condition 
Tonga contended with.  One striking difference between New 
Zealand and Tonga was historically the New Zealand state had 
been the colonial administration governing the Pacific Island 
states of Samoa, Tokelau, the Cook Islands, and Niue.  New 
Zealand saw it had a great deal of trade and political weight to 
lose if it did not take charge of its sphere of influence in the 
South Pacific (Firth, 2006).  Particularly, the Polynesian states 
of Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, Tuvalu, and Tokelau 
comprised the foreign domain in which New Zealand exercised 
its paternalistic and patronising authority. 
 
And here lies the crux of my essay’s inquiry: What political 
behaviour has New Zealand in collaboration with its Western 
allies Australia and the United States of America exerted with 
coercive will to pull dissenting Pacific Island states into line? 
(Folau, 2014; Fonua, 2014)  I am referring to the West’s 
predisposition for containment and control over historical 
spheres of influence as in the Pacific region, which in a new 
world order were witnessing fast-changing foreign relations 
realised by the pivot to China and the East.  Is Tonga a 
dissenting state?  Or has the re-emergence of Tongan 
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civilization and cultural difference to the West appeared for a 
context-specific set of reasons? 
Presently, the Tongan state seeks to control the political 
messiness and abstruseness of reconciling constitutional 
monarchy and Western liberal democracy on its own terms of 
pragmatism and practicability.  What are those terms, exactly?  
Moreover, why is history and culture the fundamental basis 
for Tonga’s political trademark as the last remaining South 
Pacific Kingdom, the oldest civilization, and a young 




Stuck on democracy 
It was my half-cast mother, Ruby Veronica Kathleen Patricia 
Brown, who during my childhood put me on a flight to Tonga 
every summer vacation to visit her sister Tina Brown whom 
she named me after.  I objected to going, mostly.  Six weeks in 
Tonga for the festive season was sacrificial.  I felt like a martyr 
giving up my indulged New Zealand life for home detention; 
locked up in the house with a controlling aunt who ordered me 
to play the piano and read books to pass the time of day. 
I was, however, fond of my mother’s three older sisters who 
remained in Tonga, Nina, Tina, and Deanne.  Now, as a 
middle-age working mother I can appreciate that they stayed 
in this small island developing state when their siblings fled 
for overseas incomes and living standards with straightforward 
access to New Zealand as their country of permanent 
residence because of British citizenship and passports they 
inherited through paternity. 
As a child Tonga’s summer heat, mosquitoes, and my 
Aunty Tina’s strictness were barely bearable.  As a teenager 
the boredom was torturous, especially when my friends in New 
Zealand were holidaying at the beach and afforded the social 
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freedom that middle-class teenagers of developed countries 
were accustomed to. 
From the New Zealand lifestyle I knew, approaching 
eighteen years old and near ready to leave home for university 
bred a feeling of entitlement to experiment with social markers 
of adulthood, especially alcohol, parties, bars, and boys.  The 
Tonga experience I was dropped into were Christmas and New 
Year holidays in my mother’s family homestead under the 
sheltered and strict surveillance of her sister, invoking an 
enduring sense of familial convention, familiarity, and 
frustration. 
I say enduring because I research and publish about 
Tonga as an academic career choice.  Consciousness of 
familial convention, familiarity, and frustration revisits my 
memory.  It is knotted into the political landscape and 
reiterated throughout my writing.  In many ways this essay 
unravels the complexity of understanding how Tongan 
civilization is made sense of today and stage-managed by the 
state as the cultural basis of its foreign relations with Western 
aid donors.  My analytical lens is focused on inconsistency. 
What I mean is that Western research and media have 
overlooked the importance of how, and by what means, 
cultural values have been systematically practiced in 
democratising the Tongan state.  Consequently, an intricate 
detail has gone amiss in their analyses.  How has the clash of 
Tongan civilization and Western liberal democracy been sorted 
out according to Tongan conditions of workability, not Western 
prerequisites for becoming more like them and less like us? 
There is little, if anything, in the present day that is ad hoc 
about how culture is imagined into existence as part-and-
parcel of Tonga’s 1875 constitution instated under King 
George Tupou I as the nation’s first statutory monarch.  To the 
contrary, however, there have been random and muddled 
reactions against convention in which it is proposed and 
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insinuated, but never publicised and proclaimed, that 
democracy is partially finished. 
The notion that Tonga will gradually achieve democracy 
bit-by-bit had not resulted in singling out the monarch as the 
culprit blocking progress.  Contradicting Western scepticism, 
the people’s representatives in a post-2010 democratised 
parliament did not petition the King of Tonga to give up all of 
his executive authority; nor was it likely a request from below, 
from the commoner members of parliament that is, would be 
made to the reigning monarch after the 2014 general election 
demanding he relinquish his power (Bhattacharya, 1983). 
Instead, the nobles were purposefully focused on as an 
object of discontent (Matangi Tonga, 2014a, 2014b).  
Criticising the new parliamentary and government system 
involved crafting a scapegoat to blame for its assumed 
inadequacy in not ensuring a commoner prime minister was 
elected over a noble from 2010 to 2014.  The nobility 
presented an obvious political target to fire at rather than the 
reigning monarch. 
For a start, the voting bloc of nine out of twenty-six seats 
exclusively set-aside for noble representatives in the 
legislature constituted the balance of power because 
customarily no dissent arose from this bloc.  By this, the 
nobility had a tradition of agreeing to which way they would 
vote as a collective in the House.  Comparatively, among the 
commoner opposition dissent, disagreement, and crossing the 
floor to the government’s side when voting on parliamentary 
motions was commonplace. 
Difficult to resolve was the political behaviour that played 
out between the opposition party and its counterparts, the 
independent people’s representatives.  More often than not 
they locked horns in dispute, refusing to compromise and 
forge any such working alliance.  Dispelling the one-
dimensional Western view that politically the commoner 
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members of the Tongan parliament had greater mutual 
interests than differences, the people’s representatives 
illustrated how divisive and splintered their politics really 
were.  Why was this trend only perceived as detrimental to the 
country’s voting population of forty-five thousand? 
In this sense, there was a tremendous tendency to argue 
that the fragmentation which persisted among the commoner 
parliamentarians of the Democratic Party and between the 
Democratic Party and the independent members obstructed 
democracy, rather than seeing political dissension and 
divergence as integral to democratic organisation.  Critics were 
wagging the finger at the lack of political homogeneity through 
unified voting in the House. 
They were not tackling the actuality that disagreement and 
factionalism among politicians representing the commoners 
was customary for any democratic arrangement, and that in a 
small island developing state like the Kingdom of Tonga 
ordinary folk had great difficulty comprehending why disunion 
prevailed.  Democracy, it was thought, would unite the 
commoners under one voice.  Nobody stated before Tonga’s 
2010 democratisation that the new political system might be 
chaotic for the Kingdom causing countless divides and 
disharmonies across society. 
To emphasise this point, a split between parliamentarians 
affiliated to the Friendly Islands’ Democratic Party transpired 
during May and June of 2014 (Latu, 2014a, 2014b).  Selecting 
candidates to stand for Tonga’s seventeen constituencies in 
the November 27th 2014 election stirred in-house conflict.  
One side of the debate was spoken for by ‘Isileli Pulu, the 
party’s deputy chair.  Pulu put forward a conservative 
argument that keeping the same list of candidates in 2014 
who had stood in the previous 2010 election was the best 
policy. 
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He thought there was little point in replacing the old party 
list with new contenders for seats.  What if original members 
tossed out of the party decided to stand as independent 
candidates and got voted in?  The likelihood they might oppose 
the Democratic Party and vote against their leader in the 
parliamentary election of the Prime Minister could mean that 
for a second time in 2014 the party lost the premiership. 
 
If their constituents re-elect them to Parliament in the 
November [27] election it will backfire on the party as 
they will become its opponents in the House.  We will lose 
the vote for the premiership and the party will end up in 
chaos. (‘Isileli Pulu cited in Latu, 2014b). 
 
The party leader ‘Akilisi Pohiva took a different stand to 
Pulu which highlighted the political leadership – leader and 
deputy chair – stood at odds on internal organisational 
structure.  Pohiva reasoned that “a decision on who will stand 
for the party is still to be made by an independent committee” 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014c, 2014d).  The Democratic Party 
leader at seventy-three years old proposed a candidate 
selection system deliberated by a third party who were charged 
with the responsibility “to come out with justification of why 
they push one or two candidates, current members, and get 
people from outside to replace the seats in Parliament” (Radio 
New Zealand, 2014d). 
Highly questionable was how democratic, unbiased, and 
transparent a selection process carried out by “an independent 
committee” truly was because the Democratic Party did not 
disclose the criteria and method for choosing candidates 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014d).  As a committee of three 
members, “Dr ‘Ungatea Kata, Siale Napa’a Fihaki and Tali 
Makahuniniu” were affiliated to “Tonga’s Human Rights and 
Democracy Movement,” which raised criticism from the party’s 
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deputy chair ‘Isileli Pulu as to whether ‘Akilisi Pohiva 
influenced their choice of constituency candidates (Latu, 
2014a).  What method of redress could disgruntled applicants 
who missed out on selection use to query the procedure? 
“Akilisi Pohiva says it is important that MPs [Members of 
Parliament] are committed to the party and are people he can 
work with,” reported Radio New Zealand (Radio New Zealand, 
2014d).  Obviously the party leader was having a spot of 
bother with parliamentarians who had contested his 
leadership, thus making themselves people he could no longer 
work with, to paraphrase his words. 
Pohiva’s system of hand-picking candidates through a 
supposed third party resembled a political tactic relieving him 
from the sole responsibility of shafting three current people’s 
representatives from his candidate list whom he had fallen out 
with.  For the men about to be terminated from standing for 
the Democratic Party at the 2014 election, Sitiveni Halapua, 
Semisi Tapueluelu, and Sione Taione, their public silence on 
the matter was telling.  Prior to this division, had they decided 




Niggling at me to write was Guy Powles assertion that 
“dramatic change has occurred” in Tonga and “the door has 
been opened” for Western liberal democracy to enter and rule 
the country.  By Powles’ verdict, there was one barrier 
obstructing evolution; “the devolution of executive authority 
has not been complete” (Powles cited in Garrett, 2014).  When 
in Tonga, as a people’s movement from below or as a state 
directive, was it ever announced that the entirety of executive 
authority constitutionally afforded the monarch would be 
plainly and incontestably surrendered to the premier and 
cabinet?  From what sources, exactly, had Powles formed his 
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Western-centric opinion, speaking as an older male Pakeha, 
Palangi (white, European) New Zealander living in Australia? 
Typified was a Western predisposition to communicate 
double standards about how Pacific Island states ought to 
develop.  Publicly Guy Powles recommended Tonga had best 
hasten the changeover to a Western liberal democracy 
replicating the developed country exemplar by transferring full 
executive powers from the reigning monarch to the national 
executive committee.  Melbourne, Australia was the city and 
country where Powles, an older Pakeha New Zealander male 
and researcher of constitutional law, had migrated to and 
permanently resided. 
But in today’s Australia, democracy as the world governing 
system was being rejected by a “large number of young 
Australians” (Oliver, 2014, p. 12).  Why was Powles 
brainwashing Tonga, an overseas developing country he was 
not a citizen of and did not trace his ethnic descent to, with 
his democracy fancies when in the very country he lived the 
younger generation were turning down this political system? 
 
Confirming our previous Poll results, only 60% of 
Australian adults, and just 42% of 18-19 year-olds, say 
‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of 
government.’  Only a small majority of the population 
(53%) choose ‘a good democracy’ over a ‘strong economy.’  
For those who do not see democracy as the preferable 
form of government, the strongest reasons are that 
‘democracy is not working because there is no real 
difference between the policies of the major parties’ (45% 
citing this as a major reason) and ‘democracy only serves 
the interests of a few and not the majority of society’ 
(42%). (Oliver, 2014, p. 3). 
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Cited above is Alex Oliver reporting the results of the Lowy 
Institute Poll for 2014 where she observed that “a surprising 
aspect of these findings over the years has been the large 
number of young Australians who reject the view that 
democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” 
(Oliver, 2014, p. 12).  Why did this stand represent a 
“surprising” element of Australian political leanings?  Could it 
suggest that a cosmopolitan climate had shaped the younger 
generation aged 18 to 19 by ideas and practices of global 
citizenship?  As citizens of the world whose access to internet 
technologies granted them conceptual reach beyond national 
identity to look attentively at countries and regions, it was 
plausible that favouring alternatives to democracy signalled 
that young people had fine-tuned a heightened awareness of 
political crises transpiring around the globe. 
A host of alternative and non-Western media to Radio 
Australia and Channel 9 gave young Australians selections for 
acquiring information and forming interpretive views on 
disruption, chaos, and turmoil in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and of late, Ukraine.  These 
were nations of which the Australian foreign affairs 
department towed the line set down by the United States state 
department, repeating Washington’s whitewash that 
American-driven military intervention through NATO was 
protecting the West’s security in war torn regions of the Middle 
East and Eastern Europe.  But who aggravated civil war? 
(Lavrov, 2013, 2014; Oborne, 2013; Switzer, 2014).  Could the 
United States’ meddling and intervention in these countries’ 
affairs be singled out as the transgressor, the wrongdoer, and 
the offender? (Mearsheimer, 2014). 
Why would an older generation of Western liberal 
democracy loyalists expect young Australians under 20 years 
of age not to criticise their country’s double-standard of 
supporting United States’ military aggression in regions of the 
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world that America is not geographically located in?  By 
specifying there “is no real difference between the policies of 
the major [Australian] parties,” and that “democracy only 
serves the interests of a few and not the majority of society,” it 
is conceivable young Australians were acutely aware that 
peace in the Asia and Pacific regions, the domains closest to 
Australia, as well as the country’s economic advancement was 
inextricably linked to the way foreign relations and trade were 
conducted (Oliver, 2014, p. 3).  What is more, if policy 
variation between parties was vague, and democracy 
persistently repeated the political ambition of obliging 
politicians’ whims mainly by not attending to citizen wellbeing, 
then logically alternate systems of government from around 
the world, even from non-Western countries, were worth 
considering as improved possibilities. 
Truly surprising was the Lowy Institute’s predisposition to 
discount human agency as the driver for change.  Young 
Australians similar to young people across the globe possessed 
and exercised human agency by shifting their views away from 
democracy as the preferred system of government, and in 
doing so, clearly demonstrating that they were a different 21st 
century generation of political actors to the 20th century era of 
their parents and grandparents.  Concomitant to this, the old-
fashioned 20th century rhetoric that democracy represented 
the best form of government in the world constituted the 
official stand the New Zealand and Australian governments 
force-fed to Tonga and Pacific Island states.  Sung as their 
favourite hymn and expressed with zealous, almost religious-
like dedication, it aimed to fully convert the Natives to the 
Western faith. 
Hence, the complicatedness of Tonga’s 21st century 
foreign affairs were undoubtedly compounded by going head-
to-head with Western development partners, New Zealand, 
Australia, and America.  For the most part, this developed 
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country trio were mentally wedged in the 20th century.  Last 
century formed the epoch of world history where America held 
the financial upper hand over all other countries, even China.  
It had become a romantic golden age they harked back to, and 
if the truth be known, desired to re-enact in the current 
century among the poor country regions such as the Pacific 
Islands (Matangi Tonga, 2013; Moore, 2014; Poling, 2014; 
Scarr, 1967; Small, 2014). 
However, the New Zealand government proved the most 
inflexible and wrongheaded, showing an unsavoury habit of 
acting on its biases and suspicions towards what they 
imagined the Tongan state had plotted against their control 
behind closed doors.  The New Zealand tactic was a 
continuous scheming of how to intervene and avert any whiff 
of Tongan dissent amidst the Western sphere of influence. 
An age-old regional policy objective motivated political will.  
It was all about propping up New Zealand’s archaic 
development mind-set that aid accelerates trade; New Zealand 
trade not Tongan and Pacific Islands’ trade, to be specific.  Did 
aid naturally speed up trade for poor countries?  Why were 
variations to Western liberal democracy, such as the case of 
Tonga’s quasi-democratic system, not accepted by the New 
Zealand government as authentic, relevant, and realistic for 




To tackle the aid equals trade conundrum, in Tonga’s 
predicament aid worsened the addiction to aid, and by 
comparison, trade suffered an agonising demise.  Overtly this 
manifested in the Tu’ivakano government budget submitted 
yearly to the legislature for approval.  Four financial plans for 
running the country from 2011 to 2015 saw a sharpened 
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increase in aid dependency compounded by a decline in 
national revenue (Radio New Zealand, 2014a, 2014b). 
The grand finale budget of the outgoing administration for 
2014 to 2015 totalled at “$483.7 million pa’anga” (Fonua, 
2014).  Tongan journalist Pesi Fonua reported the sum as a 
thirty-five per cent increase from the 2013 to 2014 budget, 
and that the government had upped its need for foreign 
donations to fifty-nine per cent, including funds from 
“unconfirmed donors” (Fonua, 2014; Radio New Zealand, 
2014a).  The fiscal situation conveyed in criticism of state 
expenditure was that “unconfirmed donors” amounted to 
unverified cash the national budget was proposing, but really, 
did not have in hand and was by no means guaranteed of 
securing in pocket (Fonua, 2014; Radio New Zealand, 2014a). 
“Have they gone nuts?” to quote Russian Federation 
President Vladimir Putin’s exclamation about the Kiev junta 
under Acting President Aleksandr Turchinov and Acting Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk deploying armed forces into 
Russian Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, 
Luhansk, and Odessa to open fire on civilians (Karmanau and 
Isachenkov, 2014).  Despite being an outcry against an 
entirely different political crisis, Putin’s objection, “have they 
gone nuts?” resonated in social anxiety over the international 
aid composition of the Tongan state budget.  Fifty-nine per 
cent of monies gathered from overseas assistance was no 
laughing matter.  To the contrary, it was frightening and 
financially irresponsible. 
The Tu’ivakano government had gotten their economic 
moralities dead wrong, according to Sitiveni Halapua, an 
opposition people’s representative for the Democratic Party.  
Worrying Halapua was national debt accrued by the EXIM 
Bank of China loan for $118 million pa’anga for the 
reconstruction of Nuku’alofa after the November 16th 2006 
riot destroyed eight per cent of the capital’s central business 
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district.  The current government had sought deferred loan 
repayments for ten years from China while making payment 
on the principal interest of $1 million pa’anga annually (Brown 
Pulu, 2011).  Still, as Halapua noted, “to reduce” the money 
owing below forty per cent of national sovereignty, where at 
present it was sitting slightly under fifty per cent of gross 
domestic product, would allow for a debt level that was 
manageable and gave scope “to develop the economy” (Radio 
New Zealand, 2014b). 
 
I think we have to reduce that level below forty, even 
if it’s thirty per cent that’s in my view, more optimal and 
more sustainable.  And that would give us more room to 
develop the economy. (Sitiveni Halapua cited in Radio 
New Zealand, 2014b). 
 
Unwittingly Halapua identified the main disconnection in 
Tongan politics.  By speaking up about the budget’s 
unsustainability, he exposed the subject most likely to raise 
dread, distrust, and disagreement between the opposition 
party and government.  The dismal state of national debt and 
the economy triggered debate on the one hand, but oddly was 
the crucial matter continually downplayed, side-lined, and 
ignored by the head of government. 
Throughout four years of Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano’s 
term in power, he exhibited a curious habit of disregarding 
Tonga’s financial problems and disengaging from crafting 
solutions.  Rather than dealing with important business at 
home, it appeared as if the Tongan premier existed in a 
different world to the desperate living environment ordinary 
Tongans struggled to survive in.  To be concise, apart from 
frequently travelling overseas with his official entourage, the 
Prime Minister of Tonga who doubled up as a Tongan noble 
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had taken to blogging on the internet for South East Asian 
media networks. 
“On my recent visit to Singapore,” began the Prime 
Minister, “I had the pleasure to participate in a busy 
programme of events kindly organised for me by the UNDP 
[United Nations Development Programme] Global Centre for 
Public Service Excellence.”  Here Lord Tu’ivakano explained, 
“My aim in taking part in these activities was to highlight the 
plight of my small island state while seeking support and 
advice” (Tu’ivakano, 2014). 
It was doubtful Tu’ivakano actually penned this item on 
the Singapore website, The Strait Times.  A likely scenario is 
that the opinion piece could possibly have been crafted for him 
by government officials for public relations with the Singapore 
state.  Ironically, the entry politely nodded to the “UN Global 
Centre for Public Service Excellence” (Tu’ivakano, 2014). 
But on the home-front in Tonga, the Prime Minister had 
met with condemnation from the Public Service Association for 
allegedly failing to comply with “due process in the 
appointment of [two] key staff in the Public Service,” Mishka 
Tu’ifua, chair of the public service commission, and acting 
secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office and cabinet, ‘Aholotu 
Palu (Radio New Zealand, 2014e, 2014f). 
A relationship breakdown had happened between Tonga’s 
Prime Minister and the Public Service Association, the 
equivalent of a government employees’ union.  The Tu’ivakano 
solution sought to intensify the rift by suing the union in court 
“for defamation” (Radio New Zealand, 2014e).   
According to “Tonga’s Public Service Association,” the 
premier was claiming $10 thousand pa’anga in damages for a 
news story published by “Radio New Zealand in March” of 
2014 revealing the union had called on his resignation (Radio 
New Zealand, 2014e).  Recapping the headline, the Public 
Service Association had accused the Prime Minister of illegally 
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authorising a government pay-out worth millions to Tongasat, 
a “communications company partly owned by the sister of 
King Tupou the 6th, Princess Pilolevu” (Radio New Zealand, 
2014e). 
 
New Zealand meddling 
To confound internal politics and pitfalls, resurfacing time and 
again was New Zealand’s wilful attitude not to understand, nor 
even think about, context-specific circumstances of history 
and culture which consequently set Tonga apart from 
convenient moulding into a Western democracy trial product.  
New Zealand ignited discordant country-to-country 
communication instead of tempering conflict.  Tonga was 
highly problematic in terms of straightforwardly fitting the 
stratified system of social and political organization into a 
democracy archetype copycatting the New Zealand example 
(Stanford, 2014). 
Honestly, the dilemma boiled down to adjusting the 
Western state of mind fixated on forcing Tonga to bend to its 
will and patronising advice on ideals of democratic structure.  
Tonga would not bend; that was an obvious ingredient 
characterising its political posture.  As the New Zealand Prime 
Minister John Key demonstrated on his two-day visit to Tonga 
on 4-5 June 2014, inappropriately the New Zealand 
government could not curtail its meddlesome conduct of 
political interference in another country’s affairs; which if 
anything, highlighted that they were the regime with a long-
standing affliction, not the other way around.  
 
He [the New Zealand Prime Minister] says there will 
certainly be discussions about Tonga’s moves towards 
full democracy.  Mr [John] Key says the power base there 
is moving but how rapidly it transitions is a matter for the 
Tongan people. (Stanford, 2014). 
Clash of Civilisations: Tonga and the West 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
274 
 
Cropping up in John Key’s statement were two tangled 
factors Tonga had to be weary of, and prepared to deal with.  
First, the New Zealand Prime Minister presumed that Tonga 
had made efforts to edge “towards full democracy,” but was yet 
to arrive at the right destination.  In a nutshell, Key mimicked 
Guy Powles’ sentiment that democracy in Tonga resembled 
“unfinished business” (Garrett, 2014).  Second, New Zealand 
foreign affairs had developed an obsessive fascination with 
Tonga’s general election. 
Among Tongan citizens it was uttered that the former New 
Zealand High Commissioner to Tonga during the 2010 
election, Jonathan Austin, could hardly contain his excitement 
on November 25th election day.  He was thrilled that ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva’s Democratic Party secured the majority of seats for the 
people’s representatives, publicly parading his partiality 
towards the prospect of Pohiva becoming elected Tonga’s prime 
minister and running the government. 
When it did not happen the way he expected and Pohiva 
was not voted in as the country’s premier, the New Zealand 
High Commissioner’s mood was said to have soured, 
particularly his attitude to the elected Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano.  Based on interpreting Jonathan Austin’s conduct 
around political elections and politicians, Tongan citizens 
perceived the New Zealand government to be anti-nobility in 
parliament and government, and that they viewed Pohiva as 
Tonga’s rightful premier due to him being a commoner as well 
as the Democratic Party leader. 
Whether this portrayed an accurate analysis was not the 
point.  Voters in Tonga’s 2010 and 2014 general elections 
understood the New Zealand government and its citizens held 
“a core belief that is very strong” (Fanon, 2008).  By this, they 
thought Tonga should have a democratic system of 
government like theirs, and would not refrain from meddling 
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in the country’s political affairs until it was a “full democracy” 
with the nobles’ seats abolished from parliament (Stanford, 
2014). 
In his book Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon spoke 
of a social condition “called cognitive dissonance” where an 
individual or group’s “core belief” is resistant to change, even 
when “presented with evidence that” disproves the belief’s 
validity  (Fanon, 2008).  Shared circumstances of “cognitive 
dissonance” seemed wholly applicable to the New Zealand 
government and New Zealanders in general with opinions 
about Tonga’s political system, including Tongan New 
Zealanders (Fanon, 2008). 
By this I mean collectively this group were certain that 
“full democracy,” meaning the New Zealand system of 
democracy, was right for Tonga (Stanford, 2014).  And despite 
facts and testimonies of Tongan civilization and culture 
advising their political structure would not work, was not 
relevant, and did not have practical application in Tonga, New 
Zealanders had become intoxicated on their self-importance to 
the Pacific Islands flatly refusing to see any different. 
 
Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very 
strong.  When they are presented with evidence that 
works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be 
accepted.  It would create a feeling that is extremely 
uncomfortable called cognitive dissonance.  And because 
it is so important to protect the core belief, they will 
rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn’t 
fit in with the core belief. (Fanon, 2008). 
 
Waste of energy 
Of course a similar complaint could be detected in the political 
behaviour of Tongans, expressly the Tongan state bureaucrats 
who instructed ministers on government policy, resource 
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allocation, and decisions about the country’s direction to take 
to cabinet for rubber-stamp endorsement.  In many ways, the 
characteristic example of Tonga’s “cognitive dissonance” was 
traced to the Tonga Energy Road Map’s manoeuvring as an 
arm of government on the international donor stage in pursuit 
of development partners (Fanon, 2008). 
By definition, a development partner was the United 
Nations 21st century reference to developed country aid 
donors and international aid organisations such as Red Cross 
or OXFAM.  However, the recipients of development 
partnerships understood that Western states bankrolled non-
government organisations from their countries to do frontline 
donor work on the ground.  What this meant is they did not 
fund local community service providers, but instead, opted to 
pay their own citizens redirecting aid dollars back into their 
national economies. 
Returning to the Tonga Energy Road Map (TERM) and its 
implementation unit which sat under the Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano in his foreign affairs and trade portfolio, Lord 
Ma’afu captured the nature of its management mentality in a 
ministerial speech.  Opening a “capacity building and 
networking” workshop at the University of the South Pacific 
Tonga campus from 11 – 13 April 2012, the Minister for 
Lands, Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources 
stated it was “Tonga’s best kept secret” (University of the 
South Pacific, 2012).  Perhaps Ma’afu was being satirical.  In 
its national operation, the system by which the Tonga Energy 
Road Map implementation unit was setting up renewable 
energy in Tonga came across guarded and hostile. 
Considering the Tonga Energy Road Map intended to have 
fifty per cent of renewable energy sources connected to the 
national grid by 2020, less than six years from now, it was 
fathomable why ‘Akau’ola, the energy advisor to the Prime 
Minister Lord Tu’ivakano and the TERM implementation unit 
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under the directorship of ‘Inoke Vala, was scurrying.  To date, 
the energy road map had constructed two small solar farms; 
one on Tongatapu, the main island where sixty-five per cent of 
the total 104,941 population resided; and the other in Vava’u, 
a northern group of fifty-five islands with a population of 
14,922.  All up, two photovoltaic plants producing 1.32 
megawatts of solar electricity in Tongatapu and 500 kilowatts 
in Vava’u amounted to around five per cent of the national 
energy source (Sustainable Energy for All, 2014; Meridian, 
2014).  The remaining ninety-plus per cent of Tonga’s 
electricity was diesel generated and reliant on imported crude 
oil. 
It was ‘Akau’ola who persuaded the Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano to ditch all other development priorities and focus 
solely on renewable energy as his pet project for Tonga.  
Hence, the reason why accelerating agricultural trade for 
small-scale Tongan farmers was removed from the head of 
government’s list of desired outcomes for his four-year term at 
the helm.  Was this decision grounded in a prudent evaluation 
of Tonga’s fragmented and uncoordinated development 
industries? 
Working across sectors towards a big picture vision of 
national development necessitated public buy-in to modelling 
community partnerships with state agencies so that villages 
and organisations collaborated with the bureaucracy.  But the 
troubling psychology was that routinely the Tongan state did 
not value its citizens as equal associates in public service 
affairs.  Did government and community partnerships ever 
really happen?  Or was it about appealing to overseas donor 
dollars through paper-only-policy by play-acting partnerships 
that did not eventuate in any measurable way meaningful to 
communities on the ground? 
Alternatively, could the real story be that racking up 
renewable energy as Tonga’s stand-alone development 
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objective resulted from cut-throat politics?  In one ear was the 
energy advisor coaching the Prime Minister on what to think 
and how to act, while at the core of government’s day-to-day 
operation were eleven cabinet ministers’ rivalling for a sizeable 
cut of the state budget to advance their ministries’ policies.  
Inescapably in this political mix, there was bound to be a 
head-on collision of development drives, willpowers, and 
wants. 
‘Akau’ola illustrated this point in his discussion to the 
Sustainable Energy for All Forum held at the United Nations 
New York headquarters on June 4th 2014.  Highlighting the 
role of the Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano as Tonga’s driver for 
acquiring renewable energy, ‘Akau’ola answered his own 
question, “what specifically does the leader have to do” to 
make that happen? (‘Akau’ola, 2014).  
 
What specifically does the leader have to do?  Well, 
whenever he meets with any of the development partners 
associated with assisting that country or state, he 
usually has on his wish list four or five priorities.  Just as 
the development partners that he’s meeting with have 
four or five priorities.  So, how do we make sure energy 
remains as one of the, at least say the top two?  
Basically what you’ve got to do is remove the four, the 
other four or other three from his list.  So, that’s why it’s 
important that he himself or she decide that this is a 
national priority and is a priority that we implement it as 
quickly as possible. (‘Akau’ola, 2014). 
 
Eliminating development partners’ goals on their “wish 
list” by forcing renewable energy as Tonga’s core business 
observably had become the political tactic ‘Akau’ola advised 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano to adopt in negotiations with 
developed country donors, banks, and international aid 
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organisations (‘Akau’ola, 2014).  The great pity was the 
premier’s reluctance to seek well-thought-out information and 
credible expertise beyond an insular, inward looking circle of 
Tongan advisors, friends, and family members.  By the nature 
of their relationship closeness to, and familiarity with, the 
head of government, the Tongan Prime Minister’s in-house 
supporters were demonstrably blind to their own biases, 
prejudices, and shortfalls. 
The truth was access to clean drinking water sustained 
human survival on the Kingdom of Tonga’s 36 out of 176 
inhabited coral atolls where all underground water sources 
were vulnerable to infiltration by rising sea levels.  Salt water 
contamination of fresh water effectually destroyed drinking 
water, food crops, and human life; end of story, end of history 
(United Nations, 2014).  The life threatening questions were 
therefore two-fold.  Could Tongans survive without the entire 
population gaining access to electricity, specifically renewable 
energy?  Yes, was the correct answer.  Comparably, was 
survival in Tonga viable without access to clean drinking 
water?  No, was the common sense answer. 
Sustainable water never made it on the Tongan Prime 
Minister’s development “wish list” for his country of coral 
atolls susceptible to limited safe water, drought, and the risk 
of saline contamination to underground supplies (‘Akau’ola, 
2014).  Importantly, the mutually dependent relationship 
between clean water and energy was paramount to human 
security and endurance for small island developing states.  In 
his foreword to The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 2014 Secretary-General to the United Nations Ban Ki-
moon stressed an integral connection between water and 
energy was a central contributor to human and economic 
development. 
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Water and energy are inextricably linked.  Water is 
essential for the production, distribution and use of 
energy.  Energy is crucial for the extraction and delivery 
of safe drinking water – and for the very safety of water 
itself.  People everywhere – but especially the most 
vulnerable and marginalized – face great risks when 
access to either is limited or compromised. (Ban Ki-moon 
cited in United Nations, 2014, p. iv).   
  
‘Asipele Palaki, the secretary for Tonga’s Ministry of Lands, 
Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources, whose 
minister was Lord Ma’afu, identified a critical factor at the 
inaugural 2011 government retreat in Neiafu, Vava’u for 
ministers, chief executive officers, and development partners 
(Government of Tonga, 2011).  Renewable energy made no 
practical sense as the country’s one-off goal which 
development industries were to solely base, coordinate, plan, 
and put into action their respective policies and services.  It 
had to be assented to by sectors as one of their multiple 
business objectives, which by no means said it was the most 
significant to their individual industry’s development. 
Forcing the Tonga Energy Road Map as a stand-alone 
renewable energy implementation unit on government 
stakeholders because the Prime Minister fancied it should be 
done immediately by recommendation of his energy advisor 
exposed a management technique in disastrous leadership.  
Lord Ma’afu’s secretary therefore impressed a straightforward 
point on participants at the 2011 Government of Tonga 
retreat: All sectors considered themselves integral to the 
country’s economic and social advancement, whether that be 
water, energy, telecommunications, agriculture, fisheries, 
infrastructure, transport, commercial business, or a host of 
other industries that created both services and jobs for Tongan 
citizens. 
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The environmentally sensitive method for systematising a 
national development strategy was not to privilege renewable 
energy above competing priorities.  Contrariwise, it was 
smarter for renewable energy to function in a coordinated, 
negotiated, and equitable fashion, partnering with other 
sectors to avoid diverting constrained income, particularly 
funds acquired from international donors and bank grants, to 
a single sector project that achieved marginal outcomes.   
Four years on at the end of the Tu’ivakano regime, ‘Asipele 
Palaki’s sentiments had come true.  Clean energy was the 
underperformer, and any prospect of synchronised national 
development had turned into an expectable and predictable 
failure.  Was this avoidable?  Yes, if the Tongan premier had 
demonstrated a willingness to listen to, and consider the value 
of, different accounts to the single storyline he was told. 
The Prime Minister himself, Lord Tu’ivakano, had little 
option but to admit publicly that “54 million US dollars” of 
renewable energy projects amounted to nil effect on lowering 
the cost of household electricity in Tonga (Radio New Zealand, 
2014a). 
 
The Prime Minister, Lord Tu’ivakano says the 
government’s multi-million dollar assistance to reduce 
electricity tariffs appears to have had no impact on bills.  
Radio Tonga reports the Prime Minister telling Parliament 
that despite several solar projects in place, there has still 
been a hike in electricity costs. (Radio New Zealand, 
2014a). 
 
The premier’s half-baked testimony to parliament on June 
16th 2014 avowed he would bring in the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) based in Abu Dhabi to 
scrutinise Tonga Power Limited’s book keeping.  Possibly, the 
Prime Minister’s energy advisor was in his ear suggesting the 
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problem lay with the “financial management and 
administration” of the government-owned power company 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014a).  But the hitch of cutting down 
the price of power was a tad more complicated than basically 
replacing fossil fuel dependence with solar and wind generated 
electricity.  It was the how that confounded an otherwise 
simple solution; how are electricity prices stabilised in the 
transition from utilising one energy source to another? 
On February 6th 2014 at the commencement of Tonga’s 
third solar farm project in Vaini, the principal village on the 
estate of Lord Ma’afu, the chair of Tonga Power Limited board 
of trustees Carl Sanft emphasised that it was difficult to fix the 
price of power.  Hence, the greatest challenge besetting the 
national electricity supply was constructing “solar farms” in 
the face of rising electricity costs (Tora, 2014). 
 
Board Chairman Mr Carl Sanft said TPL [Tonga 
Power Limited] faced a big challenge at the moment as 
the development of solar farms continues “even when the 
cost of electricity” continues to rise. (Tora, 2014). 
 
Renewable energy was a small supplementary source 
integrated into a national electricity supply dominated by 95 
percent fossil fuel consumption.  As the cost of importing fossil 
fuels and producing diesel-generated electricity hiked up, a 
total of 5 percent renewable energy did absolutely nothing to 
reduce price increases.  Renewable energy merely acted as a 
complementary power source, which was environmentally 
cleaner. 
To purchase, maintain, and upgrade renewable energy 
technology, which modified quickly in terms of technological 
advancement, was expensive.  The infrastructure set-up was 
plain pricey, requiring large capital investment.  However, the 
real catch was that although solar and wind energy had the 
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potential to “lower wholesale electricity prices because creating 
renewable energy once the infrastructure is in place is 
relatively cheap, that benefit does not necessarily extend to the 
consumer” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2014b). 
And so it happened in Tonga’s predicament, there were no 
consumer benefits to having renewable energy sources.  
Producing solar power at a cheaper rate did not reduce 
household electricity bills.  If any such savings were made by 
Tonga Power Limited with a marginal renewable energy source 
of 5 percent, then it was absorbed into making up for the 
overall cost of the national electricity supply. 
Drilling down to the bone of contention when it came to 
public assessment of the Prime Minister’s statements, politics, 
and overall performance, Lord Tu’ivakano was persistently 
criticised for being distant and detached from Tongan citizens 
and everyday quandaries affecting ordinary people’s lives.  
Condemnation was crystal clear: Tonga’s premier had a 
narrow fixation on renewable energy, and courting 
development partners and banks for donations.  Unfavourably, 
he spent too little time on problem-solving how to create jobs, 
which would go some way to curbing the difficulties of material 
survival in Tonga; hardships that were increasingly going off 
right under his nose. 
 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations 
Tonga was never assimilated into a Western sphere of 
influence, especially New Zealand’s realm of Pacific Island 
territories, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau to begin with, 
which posed a basic tension triggering tremors and fall-outs in 
the Tonga and New Zealand foreign relationship.  Did 
consecutive New Zealand governments ever truly get this?  The 
short answer was no, definitely not. 
For some hazy reason the heterogeneity and diversity of 
South Pacific states, in particular the island groupings of 
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Polynesia, escaped the New Zealand political consciousness 
which preferred to pretend Polynesians were alike, or quite 
possibly all the same by skin-colour, physical phenotype, 
linguistic similarity, hierarchical organisation, human nature, 
and poor country predicament.  In today’s politics, this glaring 
and somewhat racist inaccuracy was consequential of the 
John Key government’s attention-seeking stunt to prove itself 
to the United States Barack Obama administration that New 
Zealand was the Pacific regional leader who knew how to 
control Pacific Island states, and would guarantee the 
Polynesian sub-region, in particular, remained unwaveringly 
pro-West (Lieven and Hulsman, 2006). 
Tonga was turning out to be challenging in the Polynesian 
cluster of countries.  It was not singly the orientation to China 
and the East that was worrisome, but more that the Tongan 
state was starting to unpack a suitcase of cultural 
justifications for its distinctiveness from traditional Western 
development partners.  The cultural argument was tricky to 
delimit and debunk.  It charged off into the unchartered 
territory of power and knowledge, criticising the New Zealand 
and Australian governments for naturally assuming that 
because they had economic might, they also had the right to 
define knowledge over and about Tonga. 
Who were these foreigners, and what claims to knowledge 
defining and confining were they championing under whose 
authority?  Playing out in a sub-domain of the Pacific Islands 
region, south of the equator, was the clash of Tongan 
civilization with Western development partners.  Therefore, 
how did the affirmation of Tongan civilization as the 
organisational attitude of the sovereign state reveal itself as 
symptomatic of international geopolitics going off in other 
regions of the world? 
Consequently, media had become embroiled in culture 
wars through the mere mimicry and repetition of state 
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narratives invented by their own governments, whether 
Western or non-Western.  In noting that, what methods did 
public consumers use to make collective sense of conflicting 
news stories on the politics directly shaping foreign relations 
between countries in their regions? 
For the most part, this essay undrapes two mutually 
linked occurrences that situate Tonga in the global landscape 
of swelling interconnectedness between countries and regions.  
First of all, as Tonga’s self-styled democracy took hold, the 
state’s confidence grew to defend its individuality as a unique 
civilization with well-defined cultural practices.  In brief, 
culture counted as well as countered the Westernization of 
state and society.  This constructed a perplexing predicament; 
Tongans might have wanted to democratise but not 
necessarily Westernize in the process.  Secondly, as the rifts 
between Tonga and New Zealand amplified, it was not 
exclusively due to Tonga inclining to a China-dominated Asian 
sphere of influence. 
Truthfully, New Zealand did not competently appreciate 
and understand the South Pacific region it professed to be part 
of, and claimed as its sphere of influence.  Tonga and other 
independent Pacific Island states did not see their history 
couched within Western civilization, despite European and 
United States territorial expansion in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.  Hence, their history was non-Western and so 
too was the propensity to empathise with non-Western states 
and regions, especially their political battles in confronting 
Western and global governance dictates over lives, livelihoods, 
and living environments. 
 
First, differences among civilizations are not only 
real; they are basic.  Civilizations are differentiated from 
each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, 
most important, religion.  The people of different 
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civilizations have different views on the relations 
between God and man, the individual and the group, the 
citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and 
wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance 
of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, 
equality and hierarchy.  These differences are the 
product of centuries.  They will not soon disappear.  They 
are far more fundamental than differences among 
political ideologies and political regimes.  Differences do 
not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not 
necessarily mean violence. (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). 
 
Cited above, Samuel Huntington could have been writing 
about Tonga.  But in 1993 when his article The Clash of 
Civilizations? first appeared in the summer edition of Foreign 
Policy, which was four years before he authored his book The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, he was 
not referring to ancient civilisations of the Pacific Islands 
region at all (Huntington, 1993, 1997).  In fact, the Pacific was 
not considered in his analysis of how culture and civilization 
clashes were reconfiguring the world, and in the process, 
repainting history by brushstrokes that were not American or 
Western European.  The islands of the world’s largest ocean 
were too small and insignificant to be classed seriously as 
civilizations of old, despite the fact that this classification, in 
reality, captured how they understood their histories, cultures, 
languages, and belief systems. 
Understandably as an American political scientist, 
Huntington’s interests focused on the emergence of a new 
world order that would come after the 1991 collapse of the 
Soviet Union of Socialist Republics (USSR).  At once, he saw 
that the ideological warfare between competing political 
systems of Western liberal democracy and socialism, or more 
precisely, soviet-style communism, had ended. 
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Such a stance had been foreshadowed by Francis 
Fukuyama, another American political scientist, in his 1992 
book titled The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 
1992). 
 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the 
Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar 
history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end 
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government.  The triumph of the West, of 
the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total 
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western 
liberalism. (Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
Fukuyama was right in a one sense; the ideal of Western 
liberal democracy as the prevailing form of government had 
swept over the world in a little more than a century.  But 
Huntington pushed the inquiry further by proposing that in 
the 21st century, culture as a product of civilization was to 
become the contested identity site across the globe.  The irony 
was that in this age of globalization in which the world had 
shrunk and Americanised consumer tastes overrode, and in 
some cases cancelled out local culture, cultural identity 
politics proliferated.  Civilizations of peoples and places who 
considered themselves non-Western multiplied under protest 
against the American and Western European superiority 
complex, a self-perpetuating doctrine which connoted they 
ruled the world and wrote history.  The counter narrative 
presented an explicit critique of historical power structures: 
whose world history was this, and for whose political and 
financial gains had it served? 
Huntington’s main argument was that because “these 
differences” between the West and non-Western civilizations 
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were “the product of centuries,” they were deep-rooted in the 
human psyche of culture and therefore would “not soon 
disappear.”  Being “far more fundamental than differences 
among political ideologies and political regimes” the “clash of 
civilizations,” as he put it, would not singly endure but 
multiply.  However, this did not mean an all-out-fight re-
partitioning the contemporary world into the West versus the 
rest would be the inevitable consequence, despite the 
historical fact that “differences among civilizations have 
generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts” 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 25). 
If anything, Huntington alluded to 21st century strains 
and stresses between the world’s most important civilizations 
and their regional spheres of influence.  Undoubtedly the 
global condition was complicated to grasp in a simplistic 
narrative devised by American and Western European 
collusion (Lavelle, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d).  There was, 
of course, United Nations global governance authorising one-
size-fits-all rulings on mending cultural rifts.  Grafted to its 
side was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
policing a fertile Western imagination of world conflict by 
militarily acting to safeguard America’s unipolar power. 
Global governance and NATO expansion proffered Western 
prescribed remedies for ills that the United States inflicted on 
countries to grasp on to its primacy as the world’s only 
military and economic superpower.  The burning queries were 
firstly, had the United Nations and NATO outlived its 20th 
century purpose, relevance, and efficacy?  And if so, how 
would a multipolar new world order unfold in the 21st century 
whereby the BRICS alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa gained economic parity and political clout 
with the old West of America and Western Europe? 
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Media culture wars    
Brazilian journalist Pepe Escobar, a foreign correspondent for 
the Asia Times on Asian and Middle Eastern politics outlined 
the instrumental role that media misreporting played.  
Painting a distorted picture of reality “to Western publics in 
general” created what has been described as an Orwellian 
environment of information wars (Escobar, 2014).  Here, two 
media branches were polarised on the international frontline 
of news reporting.  There were networks owned and operated 
by Western corporations parroting American political 
propaganda channelled from President Obama’s Whitehouse 
administration and endorsed by the European Union 
headquarters in Brussels.  And there were the counter 
networks challenging Western indoctrination by asserting 
alternative points of difference sympathetic to non-Western 
centres of regional power such as the Russian Federation and 
China for Eurasia. 
As expected, the media branch which human 
consciousness gravitated to was dependent on culture.  
Culture was the human reference point.  Culture was the 
moral compass used to read a preferred media map on the 
Clash of Civilizations, and see truth-value in the narrative’s 
meaning (Huntington, 1993).  Culture was both a tool of 
inclusion mirroring collective tastes, canons, values, and 
doctrines on humanity and power relations, as well as a 
systematic method of exclusion setting them and their kind 
apart from us.  They were different.  They thought, spoke, 
wrote, and behaved differently to us.  And there was no site 
more convenient and accessible to download and digest their 
preconceptions of, and intolerances to us, than internet media. 
At that intersection where two types of cultural talk 
crossover, rebuke each other, and part ways, it was easy to 
judge them back with a predisposition to culture similar in its 
loyalty to what they had historically, and conventionally to this 
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day, paraded in their biases, prejudices, and discriminations.  
The site of contestation, therefore, was not about fighting over 
universal rights to truth-telling.  Instead, debates and 
disagreements adopted a hyper-capitalist form.  Market 
competition was about which side could bankroll the 
technology and resources required to grow consumer 
audiences in their sphere of influence, which similar to 
geopolitics were located in regions; that is, inside the home-
bases or homeland states from where corporate media 
expanded its operation outward, staging an international set-
up.  Consumption rates were therefore determined by 
business consistency at pitching key messages that 
convincingly sold and resold information to niche markets, 
which if large enough in number, reflected mass groupings 
affiliated to mutual civilizations and cultural identities.  In the 
end, the market was the winner, not the sides playing goodies 
and baddies in web space. 
Commenting on the Thailand military coup that took place 
on Thursday 22 May 2014 ousting Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra’s government, Escobar averred the political 
circumstances were “much more complicated than” the 
simplistic Western media portrayal of “Bangkok elites against 
the poor in the countryside” (Escobar, 2014).  Army and coup 
leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha maintained that “the coup 
was necessary to restore law and order, and bring peace to the 
kingdom through dialogue, reforms, and eventually, new 
elections” (Samuels, 2014). 
As expected the military junta’s take on “dialogue, reforms, 
and new elections” diverged from a Western understanding of 
political procedure underpinning a liberal democracy, which 
was the point Escobar impressed.  How can an outsider, a 
Western observer, a non-Thai with no experience of living and 
working inside this constitutional monarchy’s sovereign 
territory of sixty-seven million people make a precise 
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judgement of what is essentially going on here?  The short 
answer is they cannot, and do not, as detected in faulty and 
flimsy media accounts by Westerners manufactured especially 
for the palate, taste, and sensitivity of their kind (Escobar, 
2014). 
 
The way Thailand is depicted to Western publics in 
general, we have the Bangkok elites against the poor in 
the countryside.  It’s much more complicated than that.  
You have different strands among the Bangkok elites.  
You have monarchists; you have the military as well; you 
have business interests, diverging business interests.  
Then we have the fight against this clan and different 
clans in Bangkok.  You have the urban elites, especially 
in Bangkok, privileging I would say a sort of monarchist 
military solution, which is not the same thing.  And you 
have these masses in the countryside who revere [the 
former prime minister from 2001 to 2006] Thaksin 
[Shinawatra] because for the first time they had some 
voice and even their standard of living got much better 
under Thaksin.  So it’s extremely complicated to explain 
this in two or three minutes.  (Escobar, 2014). 
 
Escobar’s gesturing that American and Western European 
media opted for a convenient storyline that stubbornly 
concealed complicated political terrain in non-Western states 
was an argument advanced by German journalist Manuel 
Ochsenreiter on the present day Ukraine crisis as it 
unravelled.  The disconcerting pattern of Western media 
misreporting, as Oschenreiter pointed out, had a two decade 
history when it came to news coverage of Ukrainian politics 
and society.  Over a course of twenty years a “lack of 
understanding of history, national identity, cultural identity, 
[and] religious identity” on Western media’s part, compounded 
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by a wilful neglect to correct mangled reports produced on 
Ukraine, were now entrenched as the standard method for 
how regular news was fed to consumers (Lavelle, 2014c). 
 
Yes, we have to see also another problem.  We have 
to see that the Western mainstream media, how were 
they reporting the last twenty years about Ukraine?  And 
when you check those reports you will see that there’s 
one red line going through all those reports, and that this 
is the complete lack of understanding; the lack of 
understanding of history; lack of understanding of 
national identity, cultural identity, religious identity, very 
important values for the people.  But Western mainstream 
media did something what is somehow expected by let 
me call it, it’s [a] sort of new liberal, postmodernist 
catalogue of values given by US [United States] liberals 
that they say all these things like identity, like history, 
like religion, don’t play anymore role. (Manuel 
Ochsenreiter cited in Lavelle, 2014c). 
 
Ochsenreiter blamed an overarching “postmodernist” 
ideology framing a “catalogue of values given by United States 
liberals” for misreading the importance of “identity, history, 
[and] religion” in today’s international relations (Lavelle, 
2014c).  Falsely, “postmodernist” thinking assumed “all these 
things” did not figure in how contemporary states and citizens 
defined themselves in relation to others, particularly in the 
forging of regional cooperation and identity (Lavelle, 2014c). 
But it did matter, as Ochsenreiter argued; it mattered to 
the point that identity grounded in history and religion, a 
corresponding reference to civilization and culture, was the 
most important and misunderstood factor causing geopolitical 
disputes between states and their associated groupings.  
Ochsenreiter based his argument on the United States and the 
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European Union versus the Russian Federation and its 
Eurasian allies, including China, locked in disagreement over 
who was culpable for escalating the Ukrainian crisis into a 
full-blown civil war between the country’s Western and 
Eastern regions, governing bodies, and peoples. 
Still on the subject of the Ukrainian crisis, Russian 
journalist Dmitry Babich analysed the United States and 
European Union’s obsession with elections as the salve for 
patching up political schisms and cracks.  Babich argued that 
certain states, such as Ukraine and Iraq, where America had 
taken it upon themselves to intervene in the country’s 
democracy by forcibly removing an elected President, were by 
no means homogeneous in identity, ethnicity, culture, 
language, and history.  The setback was that not only did 
American interventionists misunderstand this, but they also 
clutched onto misplaced faith in that holding national 
elections “in the midst of a civil war” would create 
representative parliaments.  Misguidedly, it was thought all 
the trouble of political sectarianism and factionalism would 
magically disappear once an election was held and citizens 
voted.  America’s morbid fascination with elections as the be-
all-end-all problem fixer of Western liberal democracy glitches 
in non-Western states was dead wrong.  Worse than that, the 
United States state department was incapable of seeing why 
their thinking and actions had failed dismally. 
 
The problem is the presidential election won’t solve 
anything because first it won’t be held in Donetsk and 
Luhansk which make up 14 per cent of the Ukrainian 
electorate.  And second, even if it’s held there people are 
not going to be satisfied with a choice between Petro 
Poroshenko, a nationalist, and Yulia Tymoshenko, a 
nationalist and a manipulator.  This is the choice that 
people all over Ukraine will be given.  But the Western 
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media keeps making the same mistake; we have seen it 
in Iraq.  Just remember how the US [United States] media 
was upbeat about elections in Iraq in the midst of a civil 
war in that country.  They said that, oh yes, now we 
have that Shiite Sunni thing; hundreds of people die 
every day, they blow each other up.  But there will be an 
election.  The Shiite will get their share in the parliament.  
The Sunnis will get their share.  And things will settle 
down.  Of course that didn’t happen.  And it’s not going 
to happen now.  But the [Western] media keeps sort of 
saying what the bosses want [the United States 
government].  And the bosses want to be optimistic.  They 
want to believe; they have this almost religious belief in 
elections and courts and in so-called human rights in the 
way they understand it. (Dmitry Babich cited in Lavelle, 
2014c).  
 
Babich explained, on the one hand, an “almost religious 
belief in elections and courts and in so-called human rights in 
the way they understand it” drove American cultural values, 
tastes, preferences, and canons to go forth and dominate the 
world (Lavelle, 2014c).  Pepe Escobar, on the other, made it 
known that underneath the neo-colonial, militaristic, 
interventionist actions of America in Syria and Ukraine, the 
“Anglo American elites [were] terrified that they don’t 
monopolise information wars anymore” (Lavelle, 2014b). 
Escobar spoke truthfully.  Culture wars had played out in 
the media’s fight to control information, and the fact that the 
American government in cahoots with the European Union’s 
Brussels, London, and Paris triangulated base did not 
“monopolise information” broadcasted to the world culminated 
in power loss (Lavelle, 2014b).  Representing non-American 
media were cultural competitors with a global reach based in 
Moscow, China, Bonn Doha, and a host of non-United States 
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cities.  Broadcasting and publishing in languages other than 
English was non-American media’s trademark.  Not only did 
multiple language broadcasting stand and act for “global 
opinion,” but it contested English language media from 
completely ruling over the most popular sites for receiving 
news and information – internet, television, and social media. 
 
It’s the Anglo American elites terrified that they don’t 
monopolise information wars anymore.  This means that 
if you go to a hotel room in Karachi or in Dubai, you don’t 
have only the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] and 
CNN [Cable News Network] anymore.  You have RT 
[Russia Today].  You have CCTV9.  You have Deutsch 
Welle.  You have Al Jazeera.  It’s the multipolar 
information world that has surfaced, and obviously the 
narrative which used to be controlled by the Anglo 
American media until a few years ago; now we have RT 
telling the story in Syria, telling the story in Ukraine.  And 
obviously we have John Kerry accusing RT of bullhorn 
propaganda; of course because the Fox News is not; CNN 
is not; New York Times and the Washington Post are not 
of course.  This is very complicated because finally, we 
are watching the emergence of global public opinion, not 
only in English but in different languages, telling a 
narrative that is completely different from the one 
manufactured by the Ministry of Truth, which happens to 
be located between Washington, New York, and Brussels 
with an extension to London and Paris sometimes.  That 
for me is the biggest difference and it’s going to be from 
now on. (Pepe Escobar cited in Lavelle, 2014b). 
 
Challenging and overturning Washington’s single narrative 
propagated as truth, which in turn, was marketed by 
American corporate media, as Escobar pointed out, had 
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caused “the biggest difference” reshaping news and 
information that consumers located in every country 
witnessed and experienced first-hand (Lavelle, 2014b).  
Disputing American news stories that made the United States 
government out to be the good guys combating non-American 
evil around the world had become a global phenomenon of our 
current times. 
 
Trapped in the cold war 
United States foreign policy under President Barack Obama 
had flopped horribly, upping the frequency of wars and civilian 
deaths in foreign countries by American drones, missiles, and 
armed forces than previous bloodshed spilled by the George W. 
Bush government.  Democrats and Republicans 
overwhelmingly concurred on a contentious point in modern 
American history: Obama had no control over the United 
States state department’s reckless and destructive 
miscalculations on how to carry out international relations. 
Part of the problem were the perilous blind spots in 
Washington’s foreign policy narrative, which American media 
giants sold on the global market.  The danger was the United 
States government flunked at analysing political situations; in 
particular, the transformational power shift its closest ally, the 
European Union, had undergone.  The 22nd to 25th May 2014 
elections for the European parliament saw “thirty per cent of 
far right parties” voted in (Lavelle, 2014a).  Washington 
declined to comment as if the growing voter popularity of 
extreme nationalist parties in the European Union had never 
happened. 
For the United States, this self-proclaimed most powerful 
country in the world based the Obama administration’s foreign 
policy on America’s exceptionalism; that is, its belief that 
America’s primacy was indispensable to world order 
(Mearsheimer, 2014).  Notably then, what were the 
Clash of Civilisations: Tonga and the West 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
297 
consequences of ignoring the facts on the ground?  David 
Speedie, a Scottish academic and director of the United States 
global engagement program at the Carnegie Council in New 
York, spoke candidly about the European parliament 
elections. 
 
On an institutional basis, Anatol Lieven in London 
described the EU [European Union] policy toward this 
whole Ukraine crisis as toothless megalomania.  In other 
words, they want to exert control but they really don’t 
have any authority of gravitas to do it.  But bear in mind 
one other thing; we’ve just had elections across Europe 
where in some countries almost thirty per cent of far right 
parties were elected to the European parliament.  This is 
a very sinister development that’s not completely 
disassociated from what’s going on in Ukraine right now.  
I think we are looking at a far right backlash across 
Europe and including Ukraine that we have to be very, 
very mindful of.  And of course Graham [Phillips] in 
London will know only too well about this; you know, 
UKIP [United Kingdom Independence Party], the Front 
National in France.  These are shady people to say the 
very least and there are connections, they talk to each 
other, they argue, but they also conspire.  We have a 
series of events going on across the European continent 
right now that are very, very troubling. (David Speedie 
cited in Lavelle, 2014a). 
 
Was the United States government attuned to the “series of 
events going on across the European continent right now that 
are very, very troubling?” (Lavelle, 2014a).  Of course not, and 
why would they be?  America had no history in the European 
continent.  It was not a country of Europe; nor did it promote 
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itself as a European culture and identity.  Lastly and most 
significantly, America was not part of Europe’s geography. 
Truthfully, America was not about exporting greater 
democratic freedoms and human rights to the European 
continent.  The United States government had smugly propped 
up an interim government in Kiev, Ukraine, which came to 
power during the 23rd to the 26th of February 2014.  
Overthrowing a democratically elected president and forming 
alliances with far right parties using brute violence, 
intimidation, and destruction to property as the political 
means to an ends, did not dissuade America from believing the 
Kiev junta regime was the legitimate ruler of Ukraine’s 
ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse regions (Al 
Jazeera, 2014; BBC, 2014).  Additionally, the United States 
government had backed a Ukrainian presidential election on 
May 25th 2014 “in the midst of a civil war” and carnage 
between the West and East regions of Ukraine.  Washington 
swore this represented a fair and free democratic election for 
all Ukrainians, despite the fact that Eastern Ukraine would 
not participate (Lavelle, 2014c). 
What was America really after?  Power, was the clear-cut 
answer.  Moreover, why was Ukraine instrumental to 
advancing America’s plug for dominance in a region it did not 
historically, culturally, and geographically belong to?  Largely 
because the United States state department figured it could 
manipulate West Ukrainian anti-Russia politics to expand 
NATO forces on Russia’s territorial border, thus, geopolitically 
and economically fracturing and isolating Russia from 
European states. 
The Obama administration had exhausted its foreign 
policy repertoire and run out of ideas.  Pitifully, the United 
States government was locked in a cold war mentality where it 
sought to force an out-of-date containment policy on the 
Russian Federation, imagining the Kremlin to be Washington’s 
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arch enemy.  The cold hard truth was 20th century American 
foreign policy was redundant in the 21st century, and this 
collapsing unipolar superpower had not defrosted its frozen 
state of mind to grasp the new world order had switched to 
multipolar international relations, but to its disadvantage and 
the detriment of others, the United States had not. 
It is here that I will wrap up the three sections on the 
clash of civilizations, media culture wars, and faulty American 
foreign policy, with a memoir from Serhii Plokhy, a professor of 
Ukrainian history now resident in the United States.  Plokhy 
reminisced about his initial encounter with teaching Ukraine’s 
independence after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union to 
American college students.  Advised by the history faculty at a 
particular United States university to instruct a course on the 
“triumph of democracy in Moscow” Plokhy protested, querying 
what would he know about this subject “coming from 
Ukraine?” (Plokhy, 2014). 
According to Plokhy, the “mobilization of national identity” 
constituted the crucial inquiry into the Ukrainian case of 
statehood, sovereignty, and political independence (Plokhy, 
2014).  Condescendingly, he was told by his American 
colleagues, “this is not important” (Plokhy, 2014).  Who defines 
importance – a Ukrainian professor who studies his country’s 
history and national identity, or his fellow American academics 
at the university where he is employed? 
 
Let’s teach about democracy and triumph of democracy in 
Moscow.  I said I am coming from Ukraine.  What I know?  And 
my perspective is very different.  It’s not about triumph of 
democracy.  This is about mobilization of national identity.  
They said no, who is interested in nations?  Who is interested in 
the republics?  This is not important.  I said well, that’s the only 
course I can teach. (Plokhy, 2014). 
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Ignoring culture as a political system 
Questioning who defines importance in big picture terms of 
“global security issues such as Ukraine,” requires to some 
extent fathoming the Obama regime’s faltering geopolitics and 
diplomacy in respect of engaging and disengaging with the 
Russian Federation.  Such bungling foreign policy provided an 
American model of political disaster on which New Zealand 
chose to fashion its relationship with the Pacific Island states 
(White House, 2014; Beehive, 2014; Aotearoa, 2014; Poling, 
2014; TVNZ, 2014). 
Under John Key’s leadership, the New Zealand government 
desired the role of favourite lapdog to the United States.  In 
fact, New Zealand was desperate to be preferred by 
Washington over its Australian counterpart, Tony Abbott’s 
government prompting John Key to eagerly assent to the 
Obama regime’s rebalancing act in the Asia Pacific region 
without critically contemplating the long term consequences. 
How did “the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region” 
translate into foreign intervention? (White House, 2014).  For 
overlapping territorial disputes in the South China Seas 
between China, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, it involved an increased American navy 
presence which based itself in Tokyo, Japan, a Western ally 
looking to militarise under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.  
Contrastingly, for Pacific Island states such as Tonga, it 
entailed deeper economic dependency on development 
partners.  New Zealand therefore intended to play an 
intensified role to outflank China’s sway and hang onto the 
Pacific Islands, especially Polynesia, as a Western domain. 
 
President Obama will welcome New Zealand Prime 
Minister John Key back to the White House on June 20, 
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2014.  The meeting will highlight our increasingly close 
relationship with New Zealand and our collaboration on 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, climate change, and 
military-to-military cooperation.  The President looks 
forward to consulting with Prime Minister Key on these 
and other issues, including the U.S. rebalance to the 
Asia-Pacific region, regional maritime security issues, and 
global security issues such as Ukraine. (White House, 
2014). 
 
New Zealand’s Prime Minister could be said suffered from 
a chronic condition of short sightedness and single 
mindedness.  He coveted free trade through the Trans Pacific 
Partnership plus a seat on the United Nations Security 
Council, and was willing to follow along unquestioningly with 
any unscrupulous wheeling and dealing America proposed. 
John Key’s government amended the Government 
Communications Security Bureau Act in 2013 strengthening 
the regime’s capability to share foreign intelligence on other 
governments, specifically Pacific Island governments, with its 
Five Eyes collaborators who were the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia under the United Kingdom 
and United States of America Agreement of 1946.  A 
multilateral agreement to collaborate on intelligence 
operations, the Five Eyes alliance was, and still is, responsible 
for spying on foreign governments as well as its own citizens.    
The trouble with John Key was that he put his country’s 
hand up to the United States as the best pick over Australia to 
wield clout and respect with Pacific Island states.  Supposedly, 
New Zealand would bring them into line as a steadfast 
Western geopolitical domain.  His scheming never took hold 
over Tonga for two mutually related reasons, which were 
reinforced by the fact that New Zealand’s propensity to enter 
into secret trade and intelligence agreements with America and 
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its Western allies proved it was not a Pacific Island nation, or a 
trustworthy and transparent friend.  New Zealand 
masqueraded as a quasi-Pacific nation of sorts, while reality 
revealed its loyalty was to commercial business, and colluding 
with its own kind who definitely were not the small island 
developing states of the Pacific Ocean. 
Exacerbating tension with Tonga was first and foremost, 
the New Zealand government did not respect and value culture 
as a political system; nor did it see that a modern democracy 
could be steered, sculpted, and shaped by a culture rooted in 
national identity.  Culture was separated out from politics 
creating a dualism between the two where they were perceived 
as irreconcilable concepts and practices.  In New Zealand, 
public culture for Pasifika peoples was confined to annual 
events such as the Auckland Pasifika Festival and Samoan 
language week, while politics was defined by the secular, 
irreligious practice of state bureaucracy through public 
administration and policy.  The two did not meet, marry up, 
and produce a hybrid offspring named democracy which 
looked and behaved like a Tongan-ised, culturalised, 
Christianised, political system.  The glaring truth was Tonga 
had gone and done exactly that. 
Second, and entangled in the first point, the New Zealand 
government talked up economic development in Pacific Island 
states, but acted contrarily to safeguard the status quo and 
preserve an imbalance of trade between New Zealand and 
Pacific Island states.  Tonga understood that New Zealand’s 
exporting of free trade policies to the South Pacific came with a 
high-cost, and that the price of trade liberalism amounted to 
New Zealand and Australia consolidating their supremacy as 
the region’s developed economies by exploiting and dominating 
poor Pacific Island states for their own commercial benefit. 
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Regionalization as de-globalization 
 
Tu’ivakano: China was like the new guy around 
the block.  When we look at Small Island Developing 
States they are friends with everybody and no enemy.  
They like to help in order to develop so China is able to 
provide some of this help to assist even when we look at 
these buildings developed here, they have a large 
amount of money that can assist us. 
If we can compare to the two other commercial banks, 
they have very high interest of 10-15 percent; nobody in 
Tonga would loan from the banks because there are other 
costs affecting them.  If China can provide that for us I 
would not say no.  I would take it and rebuild, otherwise 
we won’t have what is happening now.  It’s the same as 
New Zealand helping us in all aspects of our development 
and they have always been there for us all the time. 
At the moment some Chinese run retail shops which 
helps our economy.  It’s sad that some of our Tongans 
when they run small shops they don’t have the skills to 
keep the books and they run for two months and shop 
closes.  I say learn from them because they have been in 
business for centuries. (Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano 
cited in Folau, 2014). 
 
“The new guy around the block” was causing relationship 
tensions for Tonga and New Zealand.  China had deprioritised 
their bilateral affair making New Zealand green-eyed and 
possessive of Tonga (Folau, 2014).  New Zealand felt it had 
known Tonga much longer than China, ever since it was a 
19th century settler colony of the British Empire, and even the 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano admitted openly “they have 
always been there for us [New Zealand] all of the time” (Folau, 
2014).  It stung to be dumped for “the new guy around the 
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block,” especially when the one doing the dumping was a 
developing country of coloured Natives on coral atolls who 
collectively, as a nation, were flat broke and did not have any 
money (Folau, 2014). 
The New Zealand government felt used and bruised for 
their aid donations, prestige, and influence in the region.  And 
New Zealand media indiscriminately backed its government, 
reporting that Prime Minister John Key had warned Tonga 
that New Zealand aid “doesn’t bail out loans that you might 
take from another nationality.  As long as you are comfortable 
with that and as long as your lenders are comfortable then 
that’s fine” (Small, 2014).  The other “nationality” was non-
Western, and unlike America’s International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, in New Zealand’s eyes had moved in on 
their turf, and was obstructing their monopoly over Pacific 
Island states as the preferred development partner. 
Of course New Zealand newspapers and television were 
poking at Tonga taking out soft loans from China; in 
particular, the $118 million pa’anga loan from the EXIM Bank 
of China used to rebuild the Nuku’alofa central business 
district after eighty per cent of buildings and properties were 
burnt, vandalised, destroyed, and looted in the riot of 
November 16th 2006.  The complex factors triggering the riot 
were never sufficiently analysed by media or academic 
research, which generally put it down to civil unrest exerted 
against the Tongan government’s sluggishness under the 
Feleti Sevele administration to amend the 1875 constitution 
democratising the state.  Eight years on in 2014, the Tongan 
state was struggling to make loan repayments, labelled by the 
Asian Development Bank’s economic forecasts as suffering 
from debt distress. 
The exact problem of the matter for New Zealand was 
spikier than what media concocted and cordoned off as the 
truth.  Pragmatically, the region was getting reconfigured and 
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it was uncertain at this time whether New Zealand would be 
left in on conditions delimiting its membership and 
participation, or moved out altogether of the new regional 
identity arrangement.  Fiji was the country loosening the grip 
of New Zealand and Australia to their self-appointed and self-
serving leadership of Pacific Island states. 
By formalising the Pacific Islands Development Forum and 
its Suva secretariat in 2013, Fiji had exposed structural 
cracks in the 43 year old conventional Pacific Islands Forum.  
The traditional forum looked incapable of reinventing itself to 
tackle development dilemmas.  Grappling to adjust a high-level 
bureaucrat mentality to working with civil society and the 
business sector to achieve results on the ground written into 
its Pacific Plan, perhaps the aging, somewhat cumbersome 
Pacific Islands Forum had passed its use-by date. 
Identified by the Fiji led Pacific Islands Development 
Forum was that to an overpowering degree, New Zealand and 
Australia’s predominance of defining regionalism at the Pacific 
Islands Forum obstructed Pacific Island states from being 
independent, exercising sovereignty, cooperating among 
themselves, combining forces and resources, and seeking out 
non-Western development partners.  The big brother developed 
states played Orwellian politics, watching over the peripheral 
poor states, and punishing dissenters whom they believed 
contravened group rules defined and interpreted by them 
alone without consulting subordinate members.  Changing the 
rules to the advantage of Pacific Island countries and not their 
Western neighbours perched on the Pacific Rim gave rise to 
regional identity with purposeful political ambition, which 
essentially meant inaugurating a counter forum excluding New 
Zealand and Australia’s membership. 
Expectedly, scepticism surfaced from Australian and New 
Zealand commentators and reporters about the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum’s prowess and longevity.  Was this 
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financially sustainable, and if so, where would the investment 
come from?  Did the secretariat have a viable work plan, or 
was it an annual Pacific Islands talk-fest with an odd mix of 
countries – Indonesia, Morocco, Venezuela, Israel, Singapore, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Georgia, France, and Australia – in 
attendance as observers? 
Lastly, as Jenny Hayward-Jones of the Lowy Institute 
observed, the Pacific Islands Development Forum might have 
offered an alternative model to the Pacific Islands Forum.  But 
did that make it the preferred regional body of Pacific Island 
countries?  Hayward-Jones was doubtful. 
 
And now that we’ve heard Fiji say that it won’t re-
join the Pacific Islands Forum unless Australia and New 
Zealand exit the Pacific Islands Forum, it certainly seems 
to be sending a big signal that they prefer to have a 
forum on their own terms; and to send a signal that this 
forum is called the Pacific Islands Development Forum 
and they want it to run the way it’s suggested.  So I think 
they are putting a big stake out there to say this is our 
bid, and it’s run on our terms, and we’d like this to be the 
primary regional forum, and whether they’ll convince 
other Pacific Island countries remains to be seen.  I think 
they’ve got a long way to go there. (Hayward-Jones and 
Newton Cain, 2014). 
 
Disbelief that the Pacific Islands Development Forum 
would be durable enough to become a permanent fixture, a 
possible architect of regionalism, and an undermining force to 
New Zealand and Australia’s primacy at the Pacific Islands 
Forum was the anticipated reaction.  Hayward-Jones’ 
exclamation that “it certainly seems to be sending a big signal 
that they prefer to have a forum on their own terms,” said 
more about her identity position as a white Australian woman 
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analysing the Natives.  Her surprise at the audaciousness of 
small islands “sending a big signal” was obvious.  Verifiable 
information about the Native subject, the nuts and bolts of the 
organisation’s governance structure, comments from Pacific 
Islanders in attendance, dialogical exchanges between 
countries, never made her mind-map. 
In his opening address at Nadi, Fiji on 19 June 2014, 
Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama who chaired the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum’s government council as 
the host country set the record straight.  He stressed the 
regional body had instituted “a proper governance structure” 
with “a senior officials committee, a government council, and a 
work programme and budget.”  The secretariat headquarters 
in Suva, Fiji and “an interim secretary general” were 
established.  Also, there were definite “terms of agreement for 
[the forum’s] long term institutional arrangement, and a host 
country agreement.”  An organising principle was founded on 
green economies, as well as including civil society and 
businesses in dialogue, information sharing, and influencing 
the decision making of the government council. 
 
The Pacific Islands Development Forum, our grand 
coalition of regional governments, civil society 
organisations, and the private sector.  We especially 
welcome those representatives who have found a voice in 
the PIDF [Pacific Islands Development Forum] for the first 
time, having been excluded from the governments only 
Pacific Islands Forum where they come from the private 
sector, the highly valued generator of jobs in our 
economies, or civil society organisations of all kinds.  
Your voices are the genuine voices of the grassroots in 
our Pacific societies.  For you represent the ordinary men 
and women whose welfare must always be upmost in 
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our minds and whom we are all here to serve. (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2014a). 
 
Did this allure the buy-in of the twelve Pacific Island states 
who attended?  The answer from the Tongan Prime Minister’s 
Office was affirmative. 
 
This year’s Summit will be an opportunity for Tonga 
and other Leaders of the Pacific to explore how they can 
move to the next level in their desire to create resilient 
sustainable futures for their people and genuine 
partnerships for green growth.  Since its inception in 
2013, the PIDF [Pacific Islands Development Forum] has 
been a unique platform that brings together leaders from 
the public and private sectors and civil society to address 
regional development challenges.  It also recognised that 
partnership is a critical mechanism for implementing 
sustainable development and enhancing international 
cooperation. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014). 
 
Fiji and Tonga’s relationship had been awkward during 
Bainimarama and Tu’ivakano’s terms as prime minister for 
their respective countries.  At times, it had gotten point-blank 
quarrelsome because of their ocean boundaries overlapping in 
delimiting their competing outer continental shelf claims in the 
Lau-Colville Ridge to the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (Brown Pulu, 2014).  In saying 
this, had New Zealand and Australian commentators on the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum made light of complex 
factors and by doing so, underestimated the gravitas of a Fiji 
and Tonga alliance? 
Tonga had a Prime Minister, Lord Tu’ivakano, whose 
kinship ties and political aspirations were closer to Fiji than 
the toothless and tokenistic Polynesian Leaders Group led by 
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Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Malielegaoi.  Fiji had a 
President, Epeli Nailatikau, who maintained familial ties to his 
high-ranking Tongan relatives.  And then there was Ma’afu, 
Tonga’s senior noble and Minister for Lands and Environment 
whose connections to Fiji bridged chiefly, military, and 
political networks.  If any Polynesian state was independent 
enough to cross boundaries and align their national 
development policies with Fiji, member states of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, and the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum, it was definitely Tonga. 
A critical inquiry emerged.  If Fiji and Tonga were to join 
forces to pursue their national strategies in correlation with 
the new regional identity proposed by the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum, one which omitted New Zealand and 
Australia, could that enhance the likelihood of success?  The 
unthinkable, the inconceivable, the unimaginable, might then 
become possible.  Centrally, if Fiji and Tonga backed the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum as the first-choice regional 
body for Pacific Island states, would this secure the buy-in of 
all Pacific Island states?  If so, there was greater prospect for a 
competing centre of power to materialise in the 21st century.  
Pacific Islands’ regionalism would have acquired the scope and 
reach to reposition further towards China, the East, and non-
Western development partners, subverting in the 21st century 
what historically has been a Western sphere of influence. 
At the global level of international relations, critics 
recognised that neoconservatives had taken over American 
foreign policy, entrenching the Obama administration in 
continuous military interventions which did not deescalate 
sectarianism in countries, but spiralled into civil wars.  The 
concept and practice of neo-conservatism in the South Pacific, 
however, was not wholly relevant or applicable to New Zealand 
and Australia’s mode of operation in wielding power in regional 
affairs.  Pertinent here, was the notion of neo-colonialism as a 
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system of political and economic actions which reinvented 
dominant and subordinate power relations, likened to the 
colonial era of Western European empires. 
To recap, for Pacific Island states, global politics 
represented the comeback of neo-colonial power where New 
Zealand and Australia held small island developing states in a 
throat-hold by dominating trade relationships with no 
intention of alleviating poverty by trade equity.  Put simply, the 
Pacific Rim countries refused to import agricultural and 
fisheries products from Pacific Island states at rates that near 
matched the total exports they traded in the region.  Propelling 
economic injustice was the logic that if Pacific Island states 
remained aid dependent, they were easier to contain under a 
Western domain.  Encouraging trade competitiveness triggered 
a risk that they might see themselves as equal to the West, 
and in turn, seek bargaining power and political leverage on 
par with New Zealand and Australia. 
Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov analysed the 
significance of what he termed the “regionalization of global 
politics” (Lavrov, 2009).  Nowadays, when global governance, 
namely the United Nations as a form of world parliament, fails 
to adequately identify, let alone settle causal factors of 
“conflicts and crisis situations” in various regions, the regions 
can and do take matters into their own hands.  Thus, 
“regionalization” is a method of counteracting the 
incompetency of “global politics” to sort out regional matters 
by “deglobalization” (Lavrov, 2009).  In short, it is the turning 
away from global governance for practical purposes, which 
involve countries banding together in a regional alliance to 
prevent conflict from erupting and splitting them up. 
 
Related to this is the regionalization of global politics, 
which means several phenomena at once.  In particular, 
we are talking about finding regional solutions to conflicts 
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and crisis situations.  On the other hand, the 
strengthening of regional-level management in an 
environment where the global mechanisms do not work 
serves as a safety net in case of development of 
processes of “deglobalization,” ensuring that the 
fragmentation does not go deeper, where each state 
would defend itself against all others. (Lavrov, 2009). 
 
Written in 2009, deglobalization as an analytical frame 
could be used to rationalise how to avert “fragmentation” 
between countries in war torn regions such as the Middle East 
(Lavrov, 2009).  Then again, the principle of solving our own 
problems as a collective of countries with more in common 
than in difference had functional applicability across wide-
ranging troubles that regions face. 
For the Pacific Islands Development Forum, 
“regionalization” was conceptualised through the mutual goal 
to minimise the devastation of climate change on living 
environments (Lavrov, 2009).  Endorsed as the pressing 
development dilemma constricting Pacific Island states and 
societies, sustaining life and livelihoods in island homelands 
necessitated greening local economies at a regional scale.  
From the outset, neutralising climate change by practising 
sustainable development measures became the region’s 
identity brand which the Pacific Islands Development Forum 
took on. 
Conversely, the dual driving force behind regional identity 
was independence and self-determination.  Pacific Island 
states representing the Pacific Islands Development Forum 
were firstly, non-aligned with New Zealand and Australia and 
secondly, autonomous and self-directed decision makers as a 
regional body.  Epitomising this vision in his closing speech at 
the second forum in Nadi, Fiji on 20 June 2014, Fiji Prime 
Minister Frank Bainimarama stressed “the fact that for the 
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first time, we all have a genuinely Pacific gathering” (Xinhua, 
2014).  “Genuinely Pacific” alluded to one identity shift: 
Finally, there was a Pacific Islands regional forum for Pacific 
Island states only, free of New Zealand and Australia’s 
intrusion, interference, and involvement. 
 
The inclusiveness of the meeting is a great strength.  
Part of the attraction of the PIDF [Pacific Islands 
Development Forum] is still its novelty value; the fact that 
for the first time, we all have a genuinely Pacific 
gathering that is also genuinely inclusive – Governments, 
civil society organizations and business working together 
to forge a sustainable development path for us all. 
(Xinhua, 2014). 
 
In 2013, the Preambular Declaration adopted by Pacific 
Island states making up the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum unambiguously stated its overarching objective for the 
region as, “Our Region to Develop and Our Region to Own” 
(Pacific Islands Development Forum, 2013, p. 6).  Regional 
development equated to ownership in the sense that member 
states to the forum represented, spoke for, decided, and 
carried out the business of regional development on behalf of 
their countries and citizens.  Under the umbrella organisation, 
regional polity integrated “identity” as a central creed for 
affiliation. 
Clearly stated, the forum “safeguards its unique cultural 
diversity, spirituality and identity.”  Cultural justification was 
given in that “we embrace our identity and are proud of our 
diverse cultures and values” (Pacific Islands Development 
Forum 2013, p. 6). 
 
PREAMBULAR DECLARATION 
Our Region to Develop and Our Region to Own 
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1. This is Our Forum.  As Pacific Islanders in dialogue 
and partnership with the International Community and 
with each other, we are interdependent and strive to live 
in harmony with our environment, forming a cornerstone 
of our identity and binding our far flung region into a 
coherent whole. 
2. This is Our Development Path.  Our path builds, 
nurtures and defends a Pacific that is progressive in 
improving the wellbeing of its people, safeguards its 
unique cultural diversity, spirituality and identity. 
3. This is Our Future.  We embrace our identity and 
are proud of our diverse cultures and values.  We are 
good stewards of our people, our resources and our 
ecosystems.  We envision a Pacific that is mature, 
confident and focused on its strategic strengths and led 
by visionary and transformative leaders. (Pacific Islands 
Development Forum, 2013, p. 6). 
 
The declaration doctrine, “Our Forum, Our Development 
Path, Our Future, echoed and evoked an unmistakeable 
indigenous philosophy reclaiming regional identity and 
country-to-country relations for Pacific Islanders, principally 
(Pacific Islands Development Forum, 2013, p. 6).  By no means 
did the orientation and testimonial to “Our Region” add in New 
Zealand and Australia as settler countries located on the 
Pacific Rim on historical grounds.  Traditionally, they were 
Palangi (white, European) colonial administrations of Pacific 
Island states before the era of post-1960s political 
independence, and in today’s regional economy were largely 
looked upon as neo-colonialists operating as traders and aid 
donors, who traded excessively more than they assisted. 
In light of shifting Pacific Island states towards “Our 
Region,” one that limited, if not precluded New Zealand and 
Australia planting and positioning themselves as the centre of 
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power, forging development partnerships with non-Western 
states was essential to maintaining momentum.  At one level, 
new trade avenues and aid donors were needed to subdue the 
extensiveness of the New Zealand and Australian governments’ 
infiltration and intervention in Pacific regional affairs.  
Overstating the reference to islands in naming the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum was a conscious effort to reclaim 
polity and power for the islanders, not the Westerners. 
By cultural measurement, non-Western development 
partnerships were favourable to envisaging “regionalization” 
and “de-Westernization” as emphasised in the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum declaration that, “we embrace our identity 
and are proud of our diverse cultures and values” (Lavrov, 
2009; Pacific Islands Development Forum, 2013, p. 6).  
Concisely, in the case of the Russian Federation as an 
emerging non-Western power, the striking difference between 
their attitude and the West’s was political recognition. 
Russian diplomacy recognised its state responsibility “to 
understand better the needs and interests of these island 
countries,” and operated prudently and respectfully as a 
visitor and outsider (Lavrov, 2012b).  By no uncertain means 
did the Russian Federation arrogantly assume like New 
Zealand, Australia, and America, that they knew all about 
Pacific Islanders better than they knew themselves, and were 
therefore entitled as the powerful to tell the pitiable what was 
best for them. 
 
We [the Russian Federation] consider the Pacific 
region as one of the key players of the Russian foreign 
policy given that it’s important in world economy, world 
finances, and world politics; and given its importance as 
well from the point of view of security; not only regional 
but global security.  The key players are located here.  
And in promoting the dialogue between those key players 
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in the formats like APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation], East Asia summits [ASEAN, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations], IUCN regional forum 
[International Union for the Conservation of Nature], we 
cannot and should not ignore the fact that there are 
island developing countries who are not participating in 
that process; who are not part of those formats.  And my 
visit here can really help me and help the Russian 
Federation to understand better the needs and interests 
of these island countries. (Lavrov, 2012b). 
 
“We cannot and should not ignore the fact that there are 
island developing countries who are not participating in that 
process; who are not part of those formats,” said Russian 
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (Lavrov, 2012b).  His closing 
remarks were made during a state visit to Fiji in February of 
2012.  To an audience of government leaders from the Pacific 
Islands, Lavrov’s sentiments sided with a swelling push for 
Pacific owned “regionalization” (Lavrov, 2009).  Conveying 
empathy and understanding for “the needs and interests of 
these island countries” he had met for the first time was above 
and beyond New Zealand, Australia, and New Zealand’s 
combined skill, knowledge, and diplomatic capacity (Lavrov, 
2012b).  If this summed up high-level diplomacy reciprocated 
by non-Western development partners in a nutshell, then why 
would the Fiji led Pacific Islands Development Forum not want 
to engineer close, cordial, and corresponding relations? 
(Lavrov, 2012a). 
“Regionalization” and “deglobalization” as mutually related 
political approaches to strengthening regional identity among 
Pacific Island states manifested in the interpersonal 
communication style of Pacific politicians and statesmen 
(Lavrov, 2009).  As a form of “de-Westernization,” Huntington 
explained that elites of non-Western countries had gone full 
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circle (Huntington, 1993, p. 27).  No longer aspiring to beliefs 
acquired from overseas Western education, de-Westernized 
elites had returned to indigenous cultural values and practices 
of their homeland states.  What did this mean exactly when 
contemplating the de-Westernized Tongan statesman? 
 
The de-Westernized Tongan statesman 
 
I finally don’t care  
There is nothing fancy 
in what I say 
P. K. Harmon 
 
Lord Ma’afu ditched the speech typed on a sheet of paper 
he placed in front of himself at a table of international 
panellists.  Representing the Government of Tonga, he was 
seated alongside Fiji and Belize government officials, and staff 
of the World Bank, the International Renewable Energy 
Agency, and Federation Internationale de L’Automobile (FIA 
Foundation).  This was a side event to commemorate World 
Environment Day at the inaugural Sustainable Energy for All 
Forum on June 5th 2014 hosted by the United Nations 
headquarters in Manhattan, New York.  Organised and 
facilitated by Elliot Harris of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the panel theme was Small Island 
Developing States and Clean Energy. 
 
Televised live on UN WEB TV, Ma’afu spontaneously 
decided to go for broke, a Hawaiian colloquial expression 
which meant he wagered everything on the few minutes he 
had in hand.  Delivering an ad lib performance, he spoke from 
his heart, off the top of his head.  An impromptu speech, not 
read off paper, was an unconventional style for an invited 
panellist giving out information on behalf of their government 
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to a United Nations forum.  But still, he held the floor.  
Captivatedly, the audience hung on his every word enunciated 
in crisp, clear, carefully crafted English he had learned over 
forty years ago as a schoolboy of Wanganui Collegiate, a 
private boarding school in New Zealand. 
To this day he retained his posh-sounding Kiwi brogue, a 
dead giveaway to New Zealanders he was ex-Wanganui 
Collegiate, an elite establishment for students from the 
wealthier classes.  Being a former Collegiate schoolboy was 
Ma’afu’s New Zealand identity marker, and one that allowed 
him to network at ease on behalf of the Tongan government 
with New Zealand ministers, diplomats, bureaucrats, 
consultants, and business owners either resident in, or 
visiting Tonga. 
In public relations he exhibited private school manners, 
civility, and breeding, and was renowned among the Palangi 
(European, white) community in Nuku’alofa, Tonga as a 
gentleman of the upper class with appropriated New Zealand 
values and speech.  Palangi people took to Ma’afu immediately, 
finding him a highly likeable man of his word, one who was 
sincere, down to earth, and trustworthy. 
Ma’afu’s lived experience had made him an enigma.  At 
one level he was a member of the Tongan elite, a high-ranking 
noble who had received a privileged private school education 
in New Zealand.  He spoke English effortlessly as if it was his 
mother tongue.  With no difficulty, he mixed among the 
Palangi community, a distinct grouping who ran successful 
businesses in Tonga as ex-patriate New Zealanders and 
Australians.  He enjoyed a dual-place in the Tongan upper 
class as well as with the Palangi ex-patriates. 
But there was no doubt that he was a staunch Tongan 
loyalist.  Time had progressed from his youthful days when the 
only Tongans educated overseas at expensive boarding schools 
were royalty and nobility, along with half-casts from European 
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trader families who had wealth.  So too, had Ma’afu moved 
forward.  His country’s battle was realising political and 
economic independence as a sovereign state, while at the same 
time, resisting against being owned, operated, and 
manipulated by the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the EXIM Bank of China, 
and an invading horde of aid donors all wanting something of 
Tonga in return. 
In public life, being subjected to an unstable climate where 
Pacific regional politics were bogged down by New Zealand and 
Australia’s oversized egos and in Tonga’s situation, 
government resistance to New Zealand’s bullying – all 
compounded by merciless politics – had groomed Ma’afu to 
function, analyse, and problem-solve as a “de-Westernized and 
indigenized” Tongan statesman (Huntington, 1993, p. 27).  To 
explain this point, Samuel Huntington penned it best. 
 
In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were 
usually the people who were most involved with the 
West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or 
Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and 
values.  At the same time, the populace in non-Western 
countries often remained deeply imbued with the 
indigenous culture.  Now, however, these relationships 
are being reversed.  A de-Westernization and 
indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western 
countries at the same time that Western, usually 
American, cultures, styles and habits become more 
popular among the mass of people. (Huntington, 1993, 
pp. 26-27). 
 
Jestingly, I wrote Ma’afu at the sustainable energy forum 
in New York: “Aren’t you glad your father paid your boarding 
school fees to attend Wanganui Collegiate?”  But really, we 
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both knew it was his charismatic personality and passion for 
Tonga, his national homeland, his people and place in the 
Pacific Ocean, which carried him well in the world.  Being 
confident and competent to speak with clarity of thought in 
Western settings, dialogues, meetings, and conferences was a 
skill-set he had acquired and made his trademark. 
However, what propelled him to think outside the square; 
to question power, knowledge, and resource disparities 
between Western development partners and his kind, the 
“non-Western countries;” to speak honestly about difficult 
matters to the most difficult people to work with, including his 
own people running the government; came down to culture 
and identity (Huntington, 1993, p. 27).  He was a Tongan 
noble.  No matter how fluently he travelled in Western 
contexts, he was not Palangi.  His allegiance and obligations 
would always be to serving his own country and citizens who 
were ethnic Tongan nationals.  This principle for Ma’afu, 
remained non-negotiable and permanently fixed to his 
heartstrings. 
To contextualise Ma’afu’s dialogue at the Small Island 
States and Clean Energy panel, it is important to note that he 
stood in as a replacement speaker for the Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano.  As the head of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the 
chair of the Tonga Energy Road Map Committee, the premier 
was the correct minister to attend the United Nations 
sustainable energy forum.  It was his ministry, not Ma’afu’s, 
which housed the Tonga Energy Road Map implementation 
unit that ‘Akau’ola was advisor to.  Tu’ivakano had 
amalgamated energy into his foreign affairs portfolio.  He was 
also the one minister out of eleven constituting Tonga’s 
cabinet who had direct access to what the Tonga Energy Road 
Map implementation unit was actually doing on a day-to-day 
basis to attain the country’s clean energy objective of 50 per 
cent renewable sources by 2020. 
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Therefore, why was Ma’afu in attendance for Prime 
Minister Tu’ivakano?  Conceivably, New Zealand Prime 
Minister John Key’s two-day visit to Tonga on 3 – 5 June 
clashed with the Sustainable Energy for All Forum held at the 
United Nations New York headquarters from 4 – 6 June 2014.  
The Tongan Prime Minister’s Office released a press statement 
that “Prime Minister Key will hold high-level discussions on 
key areas to advance economic and social cooperation, 
including renewable energy, which is a priority for the 
Government and is supported by the New Zealand Aid 
Programme” (Prime Minister’s Offfice, 2014). 
Whether renewable energy formed the “priority” talking 
point of the New Zealand Prime Minister’s core business in 
Tonga was doubtful (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014).  What the 
Tongan government press release did highlight was that more 
than likely, Tu’ivakano would try out his strong-arming 
strategy on the talk table with John Key; that is, the coercion 
tactic that ‘Akau’ola spelled out in his discussion at the 
sustainable energy forum on 4 June 2014. 
 
So, how do we make sure energy remains as one of 
the, at least say the top two?  Basically what you’ve got 
to do is remove the four [priorities], the other four or other 
three from his list. (‘Akau’ola, 2014). 
 
Subsequent to this, the ministerial membership of the 
Tonga Energy Road Map Committee comprised of the Prime 
Minister as chair, Lord Ma’afu for Lands, Environment, 
Climate Change and Natural Resources as alternate chair, and 
the Minister for Finance and National Planning.  
Understandably then, the Prime Minister expected Ma’afu to 
represent him at the Sustainable Energy for All Forum in his 
role as alternate chair.  Moreover, given the Prime Minister’s 
foreign affairs focus was about getting renewable energy 
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projects funded and built by development partners, he was 
responsible for Tonga’s consistent attendance at high-level 
international forums. 
Preceding the Sustainable Energy for All Forum in June of 
2014 was the first Asian and Pacific Energy Forum (APEF) 
organised by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).  Hosted by the 
Russian Federation in Vladivostok from 27 – 30 May 2013, the 
organising theme was “energy security” as “an important 
prerequisite for development” (United Nations ESCAP, 2013).  
At this event, Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano headed the 
Pacific Islands delegation as the region’s lead speaker because 
the political ambition of the Tonga Energy Road Map 
implementation unit was to host the second Asian and Pacific 
Energy Forum (APEF) set for 2018. 
When Tonga was chosen by the United Nations as the host 
country for the 2018 Asian and Pacific Energy Forum, the 
Tonga Energy Road Map website publicised its cultural belief 
that this is “not an entirely unexpected result.  In fact, it is a 
very Tongan result” (Tonga Energy Road Map, 2013).  What 
constituted “a very Tongan result,” and how did it differ from a 
very non-Tongan result? (Tonga Energy Road Map, 2013).  If 
the Prime Minister of Tonga’s bid had been rejected, would 
that make it a very non-Tongan result? 
My point is that tangled up in hosting pitches, and 
appearances at every renewable energy event organised by the 
United Nations, were convictions and creeds about Tongan 
culture.  Suspiciously, culture for the purpose of acquiring 
renewable energy was manufactured by the few running the 
Tonga Energy Road Map implementation unit, without any 
buy-in from below, from the poor Tongan citizens who 
theoretically were to become developed by solar and wind 
energy. 
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For those who have been following the Prime Minister 
and the work of TERM-C [Tonga Energy Road Map 
Committee], which includes amongst its members, Lord 
Ma’afu as alternate chair and the Minister for Finance 
and National Planning … the [United Nations] selection of 
Tonga as host of the next APEF [Asia Pacific Energy 
Forum] meeting [in 2018] is perhaps not an entirely 
unexpected result.  In fact, it is a very Tongan result, 
given Tonga’s other roles as member of the Council of the 
UAE-based [United Arab Emirates] International 
Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA, and founding member 
of the recently constituted Global Renewable Energy 
Club. (Tonga Energy Road Map, 2013). 
 
For Ma’afu, however, being put in as a substitute speaker 
meant he had to thoughtfully get his key messages across at 
the United Nations Sustainable Energy for All Forum in a way 
that was meaningful and relevant to his ministerial 
responsibilities.  Firstly, he held the Tongan government 
portfolio for environment and climate change, not energy.  
Concentrating on the 2014 World Environment Day theme, 
raise your voice, he detailed the living environment of the small 
island developing state he came from in the Pacific Ocean.  
Thus, his thoughts were framed by an inquiry.  
Fundamentally, what is the Tongan understanding of living 
under climate change conditions?  Subtly underpinning this, 
how is clean energy being pursued in Tonga’s circumstance? 
Secondly, Ma’afu opted to unfold a deeply personal 
narrative about shared experience, the culture of everyday life 
in relation to climate change for Pacific Islanders.  It was a 
topic he could speak to experientially and eloquently, while 
posing a rhetorical question: “If there is such a thing” as 100 
per cent renewable energy, then would that stop climate 
change in Tonga? (United Nations, 2014a).  Plainly the answer 
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was no, it would not, which wedged open a host of unspoken 
variables as to why not.  The lasting impression he conveyed 
was that under fatalistic circumstances not of their own 
making, Tongans and other Pacific Islanders were vulnerable, 
but also wilful and hopeful that their small atolls would 
remain, and so too, might they. 
 
Ma’afu: As it’s been mentioned before, the fifth 
of June is the World Environment Day which is marked 
worldwide.  This year’s theme is raise your voice, climate 
is changing.  To me, it is appropriate and timely that we 
have a common theme like this because it concerns [itself] 
a lot to the island states because we have a lot in 
common. 
We can physically see the adverse effect of climate 
change in our island nations.  We can see the coastal 
erosion, sea level rise that claims the low lying areas; 
that also affects the underground water supply.  The 
droughts are getting severe.  Ladies and gentlemen, the 
hurricanes are getting stronger and stronger every year. 
We normally have a cyclone season which is roughly 
from December to April.  Now, that has changed.  It’s 
from January to December.  And all we could do is pray 
that we don’t have a severe hurricane like that this year.  
Unfortunately, Tonga got hit by a cyclone early this year 
which was in category five; which completely destroyed 
over 85 per cent of all households in the northern groups.  
It gives you an idea, ladies and gentlemen, that small 
island states have so much in common in terms of the 
environment. 
I would like to touch a wee bit on energy.  Energy’s a 
funny little guy.  It’s the major factor which concerns and 
affects climate change, and at the same time it 
contributes to the mitigation measures in terms of clean 
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energy.  Almost 95 per cent of small island states rely 
heavily on fossil fuels as sources of energy, including us 
from the Pacific. 
What is clean energy?  I suppose if you ask me I 
would define clean energy as renewable energy.  The 
Pacific Island region’s initiative to promote renewable 
energy [involves] ministerial dialogue, Pacific leaders’ 
summit, road maps, civil programmes, and projects in the 
region; and those are just some of the programmes I’ve 
mentioned. 
Most of the regions actually have a target, and 
objectives, and a timeline to accomplish these missions.  
In Tonga, we have a national target of 50 per cent 
renewable energy by 2020, and a hundred per cent 
beyond 2020 if there is such a thing; and it clearly states 
[this] in our Tonga energy road map.  And currently, 
we’re working for our targets of implementing various 
programmes on renewable energy under this Tonga 
energy road map. (United Nations, 2014a). 
 
Sefita Hao’uli, a Tongan broadcaster based in Auckland, 
New Zealand contemplated Ma’afu’s dialogue.  The minister’s 
rhetorical probing of renewable energy targets, and how it was 
possible to accurately measure percentages and fractions 
against a tide of climate change impacts which had radically 
transformed lives, livelihoods, and living environments 
appealed to Sefita.  In this sense, Ma’afu had accomplished 
what he set out to do.  His critical insights contained his own 
people’s anxiety and disquiet, which he had given voice to at a 
United Nations talk-fest; the United Nations, a world 
parliament where historically, Pacific Islanders were noted in 
proceedings by others who had power over them, rather than 
speaking as, and speaking for, themselves. 
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Sefita Hao’uli: I think that Ma’afu’s rhetorical.  If there 
is such a thing (as 100 percent clean energy) is an 
interesting page to turn.  The answer is of course no, 
there isn’t such a thing so the 50 percent clean energy 
concept is a figment.  50 percent of what?  But we will 
stay with the 50 percent which has been plucked out of 
thin air.  We can now move to own more of the moral high 
ground by asking that the rest of the industrialised world 
(the developed countries) answer one question: Now that 
we’re 50 percent clean energy and still paying the price 
[of climate change], when will you be 50 percent clean 
energy? 
There is a very good case to make for refusing to go 
any further than 50 because in the bigger scheme of 
things, we could go 150 percent (when Ma’afu asks if 
there’s such a thing, he may as well say if there’s such a 
thing as 100 percent we may as well be 150 percent 
while we’re at it), and as long as China burns coal, and 
Obama plays around with the coal industries in the US 
[United States], and Fonterra suppliers turn pine forests 
into paddocks, climate change will be here to stay. 
(Hao’uli, 2014). 
 
King George Tupou V 
George Tupou V: I think it’s a natural 
development of the original 19th century constitution.  It’s 
an attempt to take the principles of that constitution and 
apply them in 21st century idiom which of course has to 
be democracy. 
Bruce Hill:  Is this something that you 
particularly support?  
George Tupou V: Yes, yes I’ve always wanted 
to do this for the country and it’s a very practical idea of 
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political life has to travel at the same speed, at the same 
level as the development of our economic life.   
Bruce Hill: Is Tonga ready for this kind of more 
representative system do you think? 
George Tupou V: I believe so because for the 
past 150 years we’ve had very democratic institutions, 
namely the churches.  Like the Christian church in 
Western Europe, even during the middle ages, these are 
probably the only truly democratic institutions which 
have existed in the country.  For example, church affairs 
are discussed freely by the members who elect their 
officials, bishops, and presidents.  And it’s the one of the 
institutions in Tonga where a person of reasonably 
humble beginnings can rise to a position of great power 
and influence by his own talents without aristocratic 
patronage. 
Bruce Hill:  What happens to your role as monarch 
under this new system?  Are your powers diminished or 
decreased, or simply changed? 
George Tupou V: Officially the sovereign’s 
powers remain unchanged because we are a monarchy 
we have a unity of power as opposed to a separation of 
power.  The difference in the future is that I shall not be 
able to exercise any of my powers at will.  All the 
sovereign’s powers must be exercised solely on the 
advice of the prime minister in most things, and in 
judicial matters, the law lords who advise the exercise of 
power.  In that case I suppose, we are different from 
other nominal monarchies which retain the trappings of 
monarchy but actually govern themselves as republics. 
Bruce Hill: Historically kings have resisted 
diminution of their powers.  Why do you think this is the 
way to go? 
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George Tupou V: Well like others of my 
generation, my education has generally been a liberal 
European education and I feel sure that without a 
European education, with a solely Tongan education, I 
don’t believe I would have been able to make these 
changes.   
Bruce Hill: The events of 2006 when a pro-
democracy rally got out of hand and there was rioting 
and burning and looting and much of the central 
business district of Nuku’alofa was destroyed; what role 
did that event play in getting this kind of political 
change?  Did it speed things up?  Or was this change 
going to happen now anyway?   
George Tupou V: There were changes; I think 
the changes would have happened anyway.  But what 
the riots did for me, it vindicated my belief in the systems 
approach to change which was compartmentalizing each 
stage of the revolution, and putting each stage under the 
charge or tutelage of different groups in society and in 
government.   
Bruce Hill: After seeing the destruction of what’s 
called 16/11 did you feel under more pressure to move 
towards this change? 
George Tupou V: I didn’t feel under pressure 
from below.  But the pressure I felt was the pressure not 
to change which was exerted on me from my own class in 
society. 
Bruce Hill:  What form did that pressure 
take? 
George Tupou V: People expressed to me their 
views, my fellow nobility expressed me their views that 
perhaps Tonga was better off as it was before under the 
old system.  Well I had a very simple answer to that, and 
that was you can’t expect to keep repeating the same 
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mistakes and expect a different result because that 
would be totally unreasonable.   
Bruce Hill: Tonga is a very traditional kind of a 
system and the role of the monarchy’s very, very 
important in society.  Will this political change lead to a 
change in the relationship between you and the Tongan 
people? 
George Tupou V: I don’t believe so.  The 
relationship between the monarchy in Tonga and the 
people is one of blood and indeed with the nobility as 
well.  In that every Tongan; there’s a Tongan phrase that 
literally means every Tongan has a road to the palace, 
which means that if you go back far enough in your 
ancestry you can find that you’re related to this 
nobleman or that one, or even to the king.  In the past, 
the basis for this relationship has been one relative 
speaking to another.  That’s how they felt about it. 
Bruce Hill: Is this new system ideal as it is?  Or 
do you think there might be some more change further 
down the road? 
George Tupou V: Well what we’ve done is that 
we’ve given it our best shot and said this is a model that 
we’ve come up with, that’s the present government and I.  
But I hope that in the future if the government or the 
parliament find that what we’ve put up, what we’ve 
proposed is inadequate in any way, that they’ll feel free 
to make the necessary adjustments.  It’s not an 
unchangeable thing.  I think our constitution should be 
kept alive with minor changes and adjustments to suit 
life as the country progresses. (Bruce Hill, 2010).  
 
Tonga was never Western 
The 2010 Radio Australia interview cited above between the 
late King George Tupou V of Tonga and Australian journalist 
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Bruce Hill is one of the few publicly accessible historical 
archives where the monarch’s words can be transcribed 
verbatim, read, contextualised, and analysed.  However, the 
transcript seldom, if ever, is referenced, cited, or commented 
on in research publications and political opinions about 
Tonga’s democratic transition. 
By comparison, often featured in academic and journalism 
works are secondary sources interpreting a speaker’s 
viewpoint on an original conversation or event that occurred in 
relation to democracy hiccups.  The slant is observably pro-
Western in the sense that a New Zealand, Australian, or 
American evaluation of how democracy has to be carried out is 
the standard measurement which Tonga unsurprisingly falls 
short of. 
American diplomacy expounded by Larry Dinger, the 
former United States ambassador based in Suva, Fiji, 
harboured a one-eyed view that the Tongan monarchy would 
be put in a political headlock; a situation where conceding to 
limited executive authority presented the only pathway 
forward to democracy.  Dinger, like his New Zealand and 
Australian counterparts, had failed to grasp the Tongan 
historical and cultural context in which politics played out.  
Narrowly, he was fanatical about democracy as his American 
mind experienced and understood it in the United States, as 
opposed to Tonga. 
Tonga’s trials and tribulations were never really about 
getting full democracy of the Western liberal sort.  It was 
always about power sharing.  How could power sharing 
reasonably work without collapsing the structure – the 
monarchy and the nobility – under whose social power and 
prestige the political system had been housed since 
inaugurating the 1875 constitution? 
A modified power sharing arrangement did not crudely 
come down to commoners supplanting the nobles in 
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government, or politically dictating to the landed gentry by 
mere fact of outnumbering their seats, seventeen to nine, in 
the legislature.  Ill-advisedly during Tonga’s 2010 to 2014 
attempt at getting the amended political system to function, 
this became the version that had flourished among opposition 
members of the commoner class, who in turn, churned out 
simplistic rhetoric to the public. 
Basically, one side could not dominate the other.  If a 
power shift swung inflexibly and single-mindedly one way to 
the people’s representatives, or in the opposite direction to the 
nobles’ representatives, Tongan civilization and culture at the 
crossroad of reform splintered into chaos and confusion.   
For Tonga’s parliamentary system to stay upright the key 
was pinpointing a workable composition of representatives in 
the legislative assembly whose political principles were 
tolerable to both the commoners and the nobles.  Realistically, 
the Tongan state was socially insular, and the political 
buoyancy of government depended on leaders.  Grooming 
leaders competent to fulfil state and cultural obligations under 
a constitutional monarchy in which the King’s executive 
authority had not been reduced to ceremonial power, was in 
fact, a tall order where suitable front-runners were scarce. 
In 2006, ten days before the eruption of the November 
16th Nuku’alofa riot that destroyed eighty per cent of Tonga’s 
central business district, United States Ambassador Larry 
Dinger wrote the Secretary of State’s office in Washington DC.  
Retracing his conversation with the former Tongan Prime 
Minister Feleti Sevele in Suva, Fiji before the annual Pacific 
Islands Forum gathering, Dinger acknowledged that it was, to 
a considerable extent, the constitutional will of King George 
Tupou V’s executive authority as reigning monarch that 
influenced how “significant” the democratic reforms would be 
in real-life practice (Dinger, 2006). 
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Whatever thoughts and opinions were transacted from the 
late King George Tupou V directly to the prime minister of the 
time, Feleti Sevele, and vis-à-vis will never be truly known; 
only recorded in snippets and fragments of the actual 
conversation recalled and retold by Sevele to Dinger.  Perhaps 
Larry Dinger had embellished his reading of what Sevele said 
to him.  My point is, the reader does not know the contextual 
detail of how the conversation took place between this Tongan 
premier and a United States ambassador, who initiated the 
discussion, and what Dinger’s impressions connote in respect 
to what was accurately and verifiably spoken between him and 
Sevele. 
One conversation point relevant today is Sevele’s position 
that “the King and the Nobles must remain players in the 
Tongan system, even if they no longer dominate” (Dinger, 
2006).  At present, this indicates a general view among Tongan 
voters after four years of piloting the reformed political system 
during the Tu’ivakano government’s 2010 to 2014 term. 
 
In conversations with the King, [Prime Minister Feleti] Sevele 
had also received the distinct impression that, while the King 
has no problem with significant reforms, including the prospect 
of an all-elected Parliament, the King also prefers instituting 
reforms by “convention, not legislation.”  Sevele believes the 
King and the Nobles must remain players in the Tongan system, 
even if they no longer dominate.  The PM’s [Prime Minister’s] 
road map is intended to preserve the elite’s roles, at least for 
the immediate future. (Dinger, 2006). 
 
Why was radical change constitutionally proscribing the 
Tongan monarch from holding the executive authority to 
sanction legislation passed in the House under the advice of 
Privy Council law lords not a popular standpoint in Tonga?  
Stability was the social gage.  Despite occasional evocations 
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spouted from people’s representatives elected to parliament on 
the opposition bench that Tonga should, in theory, pursue a 
Western liberal democracy model, the reigning monarch was 
the lynchpin to maintaining political stability and social order. 
In brief, the monarchy and to a certain extent, the nobility, 
embodied fundamental points of reference as to how Tongan 
civilization and culture operated in the modern world, and was 
accepted and understood by its citizens to be uniquely 
Tongan.  To eradicate the cultural presence of the ruling class 
in national political structure stirred an overwhelming risk in 
the Tongan psyche that the organisational culture was crudely 
dysfunctional, and furthermore, failed to distinguish Tongan 
state and society from all others, especially Westerners. 
Tonga was never Western in historical origin, human 
consciousness, and political practice to begin with.  Modern 
Tonga might have selectively borrowed and adapted political 
mechanisms from the British Westminster parliamentary 
system, but all apparatus of the state was reshaped to 
integrate into the existing structure of civilization and culture.  
Emphasising this line of reasoning as my final comment, I end 
this essay with Russian academic Mark Sleboda’s thoughts on 
Huntington’s “civilization clash” and Western neo-liberal trade 
intentions to “cement the Pacific in with the United States” 
(Lavelle, 2014d). 
 
Mark Sleboda: Huntington said in the emerging world 
of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, the Western 
belief in the universality of Western values suffers three 
problems.  It is false.  It is amoral.  And it is dangerous.  
That is exactly what we’ve seen with this attempt to 
spread Western values both by hook and crook, first 
through the vector of neo-liberal globalisation and 
consumerism. 
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The US [United States] is trying to build a multipolar 
world, it recognises it’s happening.  But it wants it to 
emerge in a form that is of its own choosing and that it 
feels is reflective of its values.  And the way it hopes to 
do that is by tying the rest of the world into the 
institutions of global governance and other international 
organisations which propagate its values.  And they’ve 
run into a number of problems.  The complete failure of 
the G8.  The subversion of the G20.  The failure of the 
World Trade Organisation to continue its mission.  And I 
think we can look at the Trans Pacific Partnership as one 
of the last big gasps.   
And it’s not only an attempt to neo-liberally cement 
the Pacific in with the United States with this free trade 
agreement, but it will also be the core, the economic core 
if you will, to further the development of a military sphere 
of containment, an alliance against an emerging China in 
the Pacific.  I think most of the world should probably 
hope that this attempt to construct the Trans Pacific 
Partnership fails. (Lavelle, 2014d). 
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